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INTRODUCTION

It is increasingly difficult to think of the economics of copyright
without also thinking about the impact of competition law on it.
As copyright expands into the realm of functional works, the
capacity of copyright owners to create economic bottlenecks
through refusing access increases, particularly where the
copyright protects an arbitrarily chosen interface that has
become an industrial standard or where the owner is the sole
source of raw data. Tentative pronouncements by the highest
courts in the United States ("US") and European Union ("EU")
suggest that the complexity at the interface between copyright
and competition law ("the Interface") is far from being resolved.1
The key issues examined in this article are whether a copyright
owner should be required to give access to their copyright content
in these situations, how far that duty extends, and whether
compulsory licensing through the essential facilities doctrine of
competition law provides an acceptable solution.
It is largely uncontroversial that competition law rests firmly
upon the frame work of economic analysis.2 It supplies the rules
necessary for the market to function effectively and thus provides
the standards for most economic policy decisions. 3 Competition
policy then guides competition enforcement officials ("CEOs") and

1 See, e.g., Frank Fine, European Community Compulsory Licensing Policy:
Heresy versus Common Sense, 24 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 619, 620 (2004)
(describing "a stormy debate on both sides of the Atlantic as to whether
compulsory licensing, on antitrust grounds, is an appropriate means of breaking
monopolies that owe their existence, to a large extent, to the ownership of
valuable intellectual property."). See also Alberto Heimler & Antonio Nicita,
Intellectual Property Right-Based Monopolies and Ex-Post Competition: Some
Reflections on the Essential Facility Doctrine (2000), available at
http://www.econ-pol.unisi.it/pubdocenti/ahnic.doc (last visited June 2, 2007)
(noting the growing number of cases involving intellectual property rights and
competition law).
2 SIMON BISHOP & MIKE WALKER, ECONOMICS OF E.C. COMPETITION LAW:
CONCEPTS, APPLICATION AND MEASUREMENT 5 (Sweet & Maxwell 1999) (Noting

that "Economic reasoning provides the necessary tools to assess the
effectiveness of competition in all industries regardless of the jurisdiction.").
3 BISHOP & WALKER, supra note 2, at 2.
"Many of the key concepts of
competition law-for example, the concepts of 'competition', 'monopoly',
'oligopoly' and 'barriers to entry'-are concepts derived ...from economics." Id.
Bishop and Walker argue that "[an understanding of the type of economic
arguments which can be put forward and the type of empirical evidence that
can be used to support such arguments is becoming increasingly important to
lawyers, economists and officials practising in this area." Id. at 3.
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courts to translate economic models into reality. 4 Competition
regimes across market economies today generally agree that
consumer welfare is the ultimate goal of competition policy, and a
free market is the most efficient way to meet consumer demand
for goods and services. 5 The goal of a free market in turn
translates into a desire to reduce barriers to entry and exit in
order to achieve socially optimal pricing.6 The greater the costs
4 Indeed, there is a clear trend towards economic analysis in both the case
law of the EU and US. DORIS HILDEBRAND, THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN
THE EC COMPETITION RULES 3-4 (2d ed. 2002). In the US, economists and
lawyers have worked together on antitrust law for nearly a hundred years, from
the time of the Sherman Act of 1890. Id. at 3, 90. In the 1950s, the economic
specialty of industrial organization emerged in the midst of intense antitrust
enforcement. Id. at 4. This meant that economic expertise was frequently
required "to determine the size of markets or the potential consequences of
mergers." Id. For the EU, economic analysis in competition law only emerged
from the 1990s, when a group of British lawyers and economists generated
discussion to apply competition rules in a modern economic way. Id. This
caught momentum and by late 1990s, the Commission started to apply
economic analysis as well.
Id.
However, unlike US antitrust policy,
competition policy in the EU is not based solely on economic considerations, but
it is also embedded in other policy objectives such as community integration.
See id. at 8-9. This makes it difficult to articulate the mainstream economic
theory the EC uses. Nonetheless, it is clear that the Commission attempts to
promote effective competition. Id. at 9. The yardsticks of these are the
maximization of consumer welfare and achieving the optimal allocation of
resources. Id.; BISHOP & WALKER, supra note 2, at 1, for a comprehensive
history of the evolution of competition economics in the US and EU. Singapore
has benefited from these experiences.
From its inception in 2005, the
Competition Commission of Singapore has had nearly a one-to-one ratio of
economists to legal counsel.
See Competition Commission of Singapore,
available at http://www.sgdi.gov.sg (last visited June 2, 2007) (showing that the
Policy & Economics Analysis Division has eleven members and the Legal &
Enforcement Division has eight members).
5 A free market is necessary to fully mobilize entrepreneurial forces in a
sequence of moves directed toward maximizing profit through economically
efficient behavior. See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND
CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 485 (The Modem Library 1994) (describing
how laborers, through promoting their own self-interests, purchase goods and
services in the market, and in doing so are guided by an "invisible hand" that
creates market efficiency). Adam Smith presumed that self-interest drives
individual competitors to persuade customers, on grounds of quality and value,
to make a particular purchase. See id. at 14-16. "It is believed that only
selection, as expressed through consumer choice, would lead to an equilibrium
of demand and supply and hence further the interests of society as a whole.
Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' . . would ... lead to the best overall solution."
Sonya Margaret Willimsky, The Concept(s) of Competition, 18 EUR.
COMPETITION L. REV. 54, 54 (1997).
6 See Willimsky, supra note 5, at 55 (illustrating how freedom to enter and
exit a market forces producers to offer goods at a price that ultimately
maximizes the society's wealth).

HeinOnline -- 17 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 484 2007

20071

COPYRIGHT UNDER SIEGE

associated with entry and exit, the less contestable the market is
and, by inference, the less competitive the market will be.7
The objectives of competition law and copyright are essentially
the same. Both promote innovation and competition for the
benefit of consumers. 8 While copyright confers a limited legal
monopoly over expression in creative works, it is rarely
coextensive with economic dominance, much less monopoly. 9 It
follows that copyright may create a legal monopoly, but the
existence of a monopoly does not necessarily imply a dominant
position or abuse of that dominance. 10 To the extent that
7 See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF
In
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 349-50 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. 1982).

contestable markets, barriers to entry and exit are relatively limited. Id.
Incumbent firms are constrained from raising price above the marginal cost
level by fear of a "hit and run" entry that captures the incumbent's market
share and profits. See id. at 350. A market that fully meets these ideal market
conditions qualifies as "perfectly contestable." Id. The perfectly contestable
market, or free market, is regarded as the most efficient way to meet the
demand from consumers for goods and services. See id. at 349-50 (arguing that
perfectly contestable markets offer the same benefits associated with free
markets with perfect competition). It is also generally believed to encourage
companies to increase productivity, expand, innovate and create jobs.
supra note 4, at 9. Competition is an instrumentality to ensure
that entrepreneurial forces are mobilized and the full potential of the efficiency
of firms is exploited. See BAUMOL ET AL., supra. It therefore calls for a
maximization of the free market and for reliance on competition where possible.
See id. Competition, in this sense, is an unlimited sequence of moves and
responses in which profits can be seen as a motive for initiation and imitation of
economic efforts. See id. The time competition needs to erode these profits
indicates the degree of effectiveness of competition. See id. (describing how
incumbents in a market will lower prices, thereby reducing profits, in order to
prevent profitable entry by entrepreneurs). It determines whether competition
itself performs its function in a sufficient manner and exerts sufficient
competitive pressure, which cannot be controlled by incumbents. See id. It is
obvious that this view of competition is a dynamic one and is regarded as the
guiding principle of a forward looking economic policy designed to achieve
growth and employment. See id. ("Monopolists and oligopolists who populate
such markets are sheep in wolves' clothing, for under this arrangement
potential rivals can be as effective as actual competitors in forcing pro social
behavior upon incumbents, whether or not such behavior is attractive to
them.").
8 Richard J. Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, An Economic Analysis of Unilateral
Refusals to License Intellectual Property, 93 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF
SCIENCES OF THE U.S.A. 12749, 12749 (1996) (noting that "in the long run,
[copyright) promote[s] competition by rewarding innovative efforts.").
9 See Thomas F. Cotter, Intellectual Property and the Essential Facilities
Doctrine, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 211, 228 (1999).
10 Id. Abuse of a dominant position is the core ingredient to infringement of
competition law in the EU under the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, and also in Singapore under the Singapore Competition Act.
HILDEBRAND,
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copyright creates entry barriers, these are usually a measure of
market control that is the sine qua non of state-conferred
exclusive rights." It is therefore generally pro-competitive to
allow copyright owners to freely exploit assets they create,
including the ability to choose whether to deal with other
commercial undertakings, if at all. Exclusive property rights
provide incentives for innovation.12
However, in practice, great tensions have arisen between
copyright and competition law. 13 Businesses have increasingly

Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 82, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J.
(C 340) 3 [hereinafter EC Treaty], available at http://europa.eu.intjeurlex/en/treaties/dat/C_2002325EN.003301.html; Singapore Competition Act 2004
§ 47, available at http://app.mti.gov.sg.
The US uses the standard of
"monopolization" resulting in antitrust injury under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). However, it is submitted
that while jurisdictions may differ geographically, jurisprudence shares
common denominators and remains useful points of cross-fertilization.
11 As the US Supreme Court explained "[c]ompelling ... firms to share the
source of their advantage is in some tension with the underlying purpose of
antitrust law, since it may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or
both to invest in ... economically beneficial facilities." Verizon Commc'ns Inc.
v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407-08 (2004).
12 Copyright aims to address the potential market failure of lack of
innovation associated with the production of public goods. See David McGowan,
Regulating Competition in the Information Age: Computer Software as an
Essential Facility Under the Sherman Act, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 771,
773 (1996). Without adequate protection, sub-optimal investment is made in
innovation by entrepreneurs who might otherwise remain vulnerable to
unbridled free riding on the fruits of their creative investment. See id.; Keith E.
Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalizationof Private Knowledge Goods
and the Privatizationof Global Public Goods, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 279, 284 (2004).
At the same time, if the incentive copyright provided to stimulate the firstcomer's investments deter the emergence of new and innovative work, we would
have merely traded one kind of market failure for another. Therefore, the goal
of any well-oiled copyright system capable of stimulating constant innovation
must strike a dynamic balance between avoiding parasitic duplication on one
hand, while preventing rent-seeking copyright owners from stifling innovation
on the other. Copyright laws give copyright owners a temporary, exclusive
right to their original works; this remedies certain public-good problems, and
allows creators to obtain an economic return on their investment. Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985).
13 One explanation for this conflict stems from competition law's "focus[] on
attaining competitive market conditions, not particular outcomes," as opposed
to intellectual property law's preoccupation with ensuring the "optimal amount
of innovation." Cotter, supra note 9, at 229, 244. Competition law assumes that
deterring monopolies will lead to the attainment of economic efficiency, while
intellectual property law assumes that efficiency will be achieved only if CEO's
correctly estimate the proper mix of incentive and access to copyright as needed
to provide the "optimal amount of innovation." Id. See also McGowan, supra
note 12, at 773, 774, 805.
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understood that copyright can be used as a strategic weapon to
bolster their market power. 14 Firms therefore try to make it
tough for their competitors. 15 Incumbents mold copyright over
functional works to create entry barriers. 16 Owners may also use
copyright to reinforce pre-existing barriers such as those caused
by network effects in tipped markets, thereby raising the
switching costs for consumers to products offered by
competitors.17
Thus, the growing importance of rights to
information in a world of competitive platforms has made
copyright law of central importance to competition policy in
several industrial sectors.18 Two industries that have the highest
number of skirmishes are software and database industries. 9 It
is important to note, however, that while these industries may
exist quite separately, they may also overlap. 20 At the Interface,
exclusionary practices are not motivated by firms wanting to
exploit consumers by controlling prices or qualities, but rather in
controlling the direction of investment in research and diffusion
21
of innovation in the industry.
14 See Gilbert & Shapiro, supra note 8, at 12749-51 (describing how
intellectual property owners will attempt to maximize power without violating
antitrust laws).

15

See id.

For an example of one incumbent's attempt to copyright functional works,
see Lotus Developmnent Corp. v. Borland Internationall, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 821
(1995).
17 Carl Shapiro, Exclusivity in Network Industries, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 673,
675 (1999).
18 See ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT: EU AND US PERSPECTIVES, at xvii
(Franqois Lv6que & Howard Shelansk eds., 2005) ("The debate over the scope
of patent rights exemplified in the EU and FTC reports . . . has moved to
questions about the appropriate scope of copyright in the face of concerns about
competition and innovation.").
19 See Estelle Derclaye, What is a Database?: A Critical Analysis of the
Definition of a Database in the European DatabaseDirective and Suggestions
for an International Definition, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 981, 982 (2002);
Gilbert & Shapiro, supra note 8, at 12750. Databases may broadly be
understood to include "a collection of independent works [or] data ... arranged
in a systematic or methodical way" that may be "individually accessible by
[both] electronic [and non-electronic means]," and cover vastly diverse subject
matter from telephone directories to television programs. See Derclaye, What is
a Database?,supra, at 983-84, 996-97. Gilbert and Shapiro have observed that
essential facilities doctrine claims will likely occur in areas where copyright has
expanded into functional work. See Gilbert & Shapiro, supra note 8, at 12755.
20 For example, if the software is necessary for the manufacture or operation
of databases, or if the database is computer-generated.
21 See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Business Rights and
Competition of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 5 (2000) (statement
of Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice),
16
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In response to this anticompetitive threat, competition law has
devised the essential facilities doctrine ("EFD") to mandate
access through requiring compulsory licensing. 22 The focus of an
EFD inquiry is not on the conduct of the firm, but rather on the
structural conditions of the relevant market, typically
"bottleneck" situations, where the copyright owner controls a
"facility" that is indispensable to its competitors and refuses to
grant access to that facility. 23 The EFD eschews copyright's
rationale for protecting market power, and it imposes a duty to
deal fairly with rivals or continue a relationship once it has
begun. 24 Access must therefore be given on reasonable and nonavailable at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/testimony/4381.pdf ("The more
important that innovation becomes to society, the more important it is to
preserve economic incentives to innovate."). See also Antitrust Considerations
in International Defense Mergers: Hearing Before the American Instit. of
Aeronautics and Astronautics, at 3 (1999) (statement of Robert Kramer, Chief,
Litigation II Section, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice) ("As important as
price competition is to us, a second and possibly even greater concern is
maintaining competition for innovation.").
22 The EFD grew out of cases where a vertically integrated owner had
exclusive control over some facility and used that control to gain advantage over
competitors in an adjacent or downstream market. See Gilbert & Shapiro,
supra note 8, at 12751. It was first discussed in the US in United States v.
Terminal Railroad Ass'n of St. Louis, in which a set of railroads formed a joint
venture owning a key bridge across the Mississippi River and excluded nonmember competitors. 224 U.S. 383, 391-92, 397-98, 409 (1912). In the EU, the
EFD was first discussed in B&I Line plc v. Sealink Harbours Ltd [B&I
Line/Stena Sealink], 5 C.M.L.R. 255 (1992), where a port owner was prohibited
from imposing competitive constraints on downstream customers. See Frank
Fine, NDC/IMS: A Logical Application of Essential FacilitiesDoctrine, 23 EUR.
at
http:l
(2002),
available
457
L.
REV.
COMPETITION
(last visited
www.ftc.gov/os/comments/intelpropertycomments/finefrank.pdf
June 2, 2007). The doctrine has also surfaced in cases involving such
"bottleneck" inputs as sports stadiums, warehouse spaces and newspaper
distribution systems. However, recent cases have focused on technological
knowledge for access to networks. These include "physical networks like
electricity or telecommunications, where there are clear elements of natural
monopoly and the presence of explicit regulation," as well as "virtual" networks.
Richard N. Langlois, Technological Standards, Innovation, and Essential
FacilitiesToward a Schumpeterian Post-ChicagoApproach 4-5 (Univ. of Conn.
available at
1999-07,
1999),
Working
Paper
of
Econ.,
Dep't
http://www.econ.uconn.edu/working/1999-07.pdf.
23 Gilbert & Shapiro, supra note 8, at 12750-51.
"[I]n certain cases a dominant undertaking must not merely
24 See id.
refrain from anti-competitive action but must actively promote competition by
allowing potential competitors access to the facilities which it has developed."
Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7791, [ 34. See also
Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. at 411 (ordering owners of railroad terminal to
allow competitors use of its facility for a reasonable charge).
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discriminatory terms.
Further, the EFD "is most likely to
condemn [copyright] in precisely those circumstances in which
[intervention] is least defensible . . . the more [a copyrighted
work] is unique, valuable, and difficult to duplicate, the greater

is the obligation to share

it."25

However, the last few decades have witnessed the development
of diverse approaches to the evolving paradigm. 26 US cases have
thus far limited the EFD to situations where foreclosure of
competition in the downstream market would occur or where the
refusal of the EFD would help the owner to acquire or maintain a
monopoly in that market. 27 Recent case law has suggested it has
been limited even further. 28 The "exceptional circumstances" test
developed by European courts has a lower threshold, 29 since the
prohibition is directed toward a broader concept of "abuse."30
25 Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities,51 STAN. L.
REV. 1187, 1219 (1999).
26 Various economic schools of thought, such as the "Harvard School's"
"structure-conduct-performance" model, the laissez faire "Chicago School" and

the "Post-Chicago School's" game-theoretic approach, have helped to redefine
the study of competition law and expose the important economic implications of
copyright exploitation. HILDEBRAND, supranote 4, at 126, 148-51.
27 A. Michael Froomkin & Mark A. Lemley, ICANN and Antitrust, 2003 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1, 46 (2003) ("Otter Tail and MCI both had such a characteristic. In
the absence of such a market effect, condemning a truly unilateral refusal to
deal could open the door to all sorts of claims in which competition is not really
at stake.").
28 See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398, 407-08 (2004) (requiring proof of anticompetitive conduct in addition
to a showing of monopoly power).
29 See James S. Venit & John J. Kallaugher, Essential Facilities: A
Comparative Law Approach, in 21 ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM
CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE ON INT'L LAw & POLICY 1994, 315, 333 (1995)
(comparing EFD in the US and under the EC, which doesn't require a showing
of extensive monopoly power in downstream markets). The test stemmed from
the European court's recognition in AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd. of liability
through "arbitrary refusals" to supply spare parts based on design rights as
abuse under Article 82. Case 238/87, A.B. Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd., 1988
E.C.R. 6211, T 9. As the court explained, this included "arbitrary refusal to
supply spare parts to independent repairers, the fixing of prices for spare parts
at an unfair level or a decision no longer to produce spare parts for a particular
model even though many cars of that model are still in circulation." Id.
30 See Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 29, at 325-26, 328. This conceivably
includes using the essential facilities to prevent rivals entering or remaining in
the primary market. Id. at 333, 339-40 ("[In the United States the essential
facility doctrine focuses on effects in markets where a firm holds market power
subject to control under Section 2. The Article 86 [now Article 82] cases, in
contrast, appear to apply the concept in a monopoly leveraging context without
extensive consideration of the extent to which the dominant firm holds a
dominant position in a downstream market.").
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These divisions between the US approach and EU approach
reflect contrary views about the complexity and robustness of
markets as well as the ability of courts and CEOs to correct
31
market failure.
Issues at the Interface are not merely of microeconomic
interest. Industries where technological innovation is a central
dimension of performance increasingly affect the global
economy. 32 Multi-national companies want rules that reflect
31

US antitrust jurisprudence has been largely influenced by the Chicago

School.

ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH

xi (The Free Press 1978). This School assumes that competition in
markets can be reasonably good even with high market concentrations because
of self-regulating ability of the market to select the most efficient firms.
HILDEBRAND, supra note 4, at 144. It follows that the state should intervene
only minimally to provide a legal framework. See id. at 174. Copyright reduces
transaction costs and . addresses the free rider problem, and should be
permitted. See id. at 171 (describing George Stigler's idea of Economic
Darwinism). For an explanation of this view of Economic Darwinism, see
GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY (University of Chicago
Press 1968). EU regulators seem split between two schools. The first is the
Harvard School, which argues that concentrated markets decrease the intensity
of competition and leads to inefficient distribution and use of available
resources. Michael S. Jacob, An Essay on the Normative Foundations of
Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REV. 219, 227 (1995). The lack of competition
provides few incentives to increase the overall performance through cost
reduction and innovation. See id. As a result, a dominant firm may directly
harm other market participants, and indirectly harm consumer welfare. All
entry barriers should therefore be kept to a minimum. The second strand of EU
thought seems to lie with the post-Chicago approach. This school believes that
the Chicago School places too much confidence in market discipline. Id. at 22223. There is potential for market imperfections and barriers to entry, such as
those created by the exercise of copyright, to inhibit the competitive process and
thus greater need for government action. See Hildebrand, supra note 4, at 177.
Further, it says that Chicago models are too abstract and simplistic to address
market realities. They believe that economic theory should be used to highlight
uncertainties on a given set of facts rather than economic filters and efficiency
based defenses. Id. In network markets, dominant firms can obtain decisive
advantages that enable them to exclude superior standard due to a high degree
of path dependency. See Shapiro, supra note 17, at 681. This ties users to a
particular standard, not because it is superior, but because compatibility is
essential and others use the established technology as well. See id. at 682.
32 "[In the [US], government reports have credited productivity growth
driven by technological change with stimulating the major economic expansions
of the 1960s, 1980s, and 1990s." ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT: EU AND
US PERSPECTIVES, supra note 18, at xvi. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT
35 (U.S. GOV'T PRINTING OFFICE 2000) [hereinafter ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT]. Although accurate estimates of the percentage of economic output
or growth that can be attributed to innovation are elusive, policy makers and
economists strongly agree that innovation is a critical component of long-run
economic health. See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra, at 173. See
also ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT: EU AND US PERSPECTIVES, supra note
ITSELF
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home rules as closely as possible. 33 At the same time, while
minimum standards of copyright protection are necessary to
attract foreign investment from copyright conglomerates, 34 an
over-zealous application of competition policy risks alienating
owners who may take their business, as well as accompanying
35
jobs and investments, elsewhere.
As the globe tilts toward Asia, the Asian perspective will
become increasingly significant. China, long under US pressure
to strengthen its copyright laws, has finally made steps toward
doing So. 3 6 At about the same time, this awakening economic
18, at xvi (reporting how "high technology" sectors in the economy "increased
their combined share of manufacturing output by more than 50 percent"). For a
EU perspective on the patent right debate, see id. at xvii ("The debate over the
scope of patent rights exemplified in the EU and FTC reports ...has moved to
questions about the appropriate scope of copyright in the face of concerns about
competition and innovation.").
33 See, e.g., COMMENTS OF MICROSOFT ON THE COMPETITION COMMISSION OF
SINGAPORE'S DRAFT GUIDELINE ON THE TREATMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS 3-5, available at http://www.ccs.gov.sg/PublicConsultation/Archives/

Draft+Guidelines+on+IPR.htm (click on "Microsoft Singapore Pte Ltd.") (last
visited June 2, 2007) (showing how Microsoft, a US company, supported IPR
guidelines for Singapore that focused on strong protection of IPRs, even if doing
so would create an essential monopoly that seems inconsistent with competition
law; this view is consistent with Microsoft's home climate in the US).
34 See J. H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global
Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 11, 1415, 21-22 (1997) (arguing that a minimum international standard of protection
is required to give a sense of security to technology-exporting firms).
35 Id. at 52-54.
A recent reminder of this came from a South Korean
competition case against Microsoft, where the latter threatened to withdraw its
Windows operating system from the Republic when South Korea's national
competition authority alluded that it might impose an order requiring Microsoft
to remove code or redesign Windows uniquely for the Korean market. See
12, 2005,
South Korea Fines Microsoft $32m, BBC NEWS, Dec.
For reasons known best to
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/4505698.stm.
itself, Microsoft later decided otherwise. See id. See also VALENTINE KORAH,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EC COMPETITION RULES 172 (Hart
Publishing 2006) ("I remain concerned that the EC position is in many ways
stricter than that in the US. This may encourage firms to perform their R&D
and produce the results outside the Common Market, exporting the products to
the Common Market. This avoids the wider scope of Article 82 and the special
responsibility of dominant firms to give access to essential facilities.").
36 Chinese Govt Approves Draft of Anti-Monopoly Law, NEWS GUANDONG,
2006,
http://www.newsgd.com/business/laws/200606080010.htm
Jun.
8,
[hereinafter NEWS GUANDONG]. As China and other emerging economies move
toward an innovation-based economy, it would increasingly be in its own
interest to bolster copyright protection. See U.S. Chamber of Commerce Views
on China's Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights and the Dangers of the
Movement of Counterfeited and PiratedGoods into the United States: Testimony
Before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (2006)
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leviathan has also taken concrete steps toward enacting its own
anti-monopoly laws. 37 It follows that stakeholders in China will
eventually have to contend with similar tensions in determining
access to functional works, and will likely take a reference from
major trading partners who already have a mature competition
regime. And as economies like China rise, the experiences of
"culture-bridging countries" such as Singapore will become
38
increasingly useful reference points.
In Singapore, copyright is big business. In 2003, the IP
Academy undertook the first study in Asia using the World
Intellectual Property Office ("WIPO") framework to measure the
economic magnitude of copyright industries. 39 It found that these
industries generated an output of SGD 30.5 billion, amounting to
5.7% of GDP in 2001.40
These industries also provided
employment for 118,600 people, or 5.8% of the workforce. 41 Like
(statement of Myron Brilliant, Vice-President, East Asia, US Chamber of
Commerce) ("IPR violations could pose a greater threat to China's own economic
development and security than they do to foreign rights holders."). China has
abolished more than 700 trade-related laws and regulations in order to meet
requirements for the World Trade Organization. Embassy of the People's
Republic of China in the United States, Appraisal of China's WTO Performance
Cover Global Media (2006), http://www.china-embassy.org/englxw/t283242.htm.
At least part of the impetus for this may be threatened sanctions by the US
against China for rampant copyright violations that allegedly cost US
companies some $200 billion a year. US May Take China to WTO on $200 bn
Piracy,
THE
FINANCIAL
ExPREss,
May
17,
2005,
http://www.financialexpress.com/latest-fullstory.php?contentid=91135.
37 Chinese Govt Approves Draft of Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 36
(reporting that the anti-monopoly law will be "aimed at protecting fair
competition, preventing and checking monopolistic behavior, and maintaining
an orderly marketplace.").
38 See Law Siu Lan, Lion and Dragon: Singapore is Building an Enclave in
China. Will It Succeed?, ASIAWEEK, June 21, 1996, available at
http://www.pathfinder.com/asiaweek/96/0621/bizl.html. Singapore has worked
closely with China in establishing special economic zones such as those in
Suzhou and Liaoning, and has provided not insignificant advice on its economic
policies in these areas.
See Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Minister for
Education, Second Minister for Finance, Speech at the 1st Singapore-Liaoning
Economic & Trade Council Meeting (Apr. 20, 2004), available at
http://www.moe.gov.sg/speeches/2004/sp20040420.htm.
39 CHOW KIT BOEY & LEO KAH MUN, ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF COPYRIGHTBASED
INDUSTRIES
IN
SINGAPORE
1
(June 2005), available at
http://www.serci.org/documents.html; see also ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF
COPYRIGHT-BASED
INDUSTRIES IN SINGAPORE:
AN UPDATE, available at
http://www.ipacademy.edu. sg/site/ipacws/resource/executive%20summaries/Ex
ecSumEconomicUpd.pdf (last visited June 2, 2007) (reporting updated
figures through 2002 and 2003).
40 Id.
41 Id.
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the US and EU, Singapore has opted for a general competition
regime rather than legislative exemption of intellectual property
rights ("IPRs"), leaving the task of balancing the needs of
42
innovation within competition law itself.
Strikingly, unlike the US and EU, Singapore has explicitly
recognized the EFD. 43 At the same time, the official guideline
issued by the Competition Commission of Singapore ("CCS")
suggests that a refusal to supply copyright content will constitute
an anticompetitive infringement in "limited circumstances," such
as when the refusal "relates to an essential facility, with the
effect of (likely) substantial harm to competition." 44 One relevant
factor is the presence of network effects. 45 The extent of the
actual impact of the EFD on the exploitation of copyright in
Singapore is difficult to assess at this stage because of the
nascence of the regulatory framework. However, it has taken a
the fundamental
towards emphasizing
deliberate
step
compatibility between the objectives of IPRs and competition law
while providing broad caveats. 46 One may therefore speculate
that copyrights are less likely to be interfered with in Singapore
47
than in the EU.
42

See generally

COMPETITION

COMMISSION

OF

SINGAPORE,

CCS

DRAFT

available at
http://www.ccs.gov.sg/NR/rdonlyres/F7E 1707A-D595-4A2A-AC51-502AA41F98
B4/0/CCSDraftGuidelineOnTreatmentOfIPRFinal.pdf [hereinafter CCS DRAFT
GUIDELINE]. Japan, and to a smaller extent, Australia, have opted for a general
See Steven D. Anderman, Issues Raised at the
competition regime.
IP/Competition Interface: Lessons from Singapore, paper presented at the
Twelfth Annual Fordham International Intellectual Property Law & Policy
Conference (2004).
43 CCS DRAFT GUIDELINE, supra note 42, 4.6.
44 Id.
45 Id. T 3.12.
46 See id.
4.6-4.8 (describing the caveats in which the EFD will not be
followed to require access to facilities be given). First, refusing to license may
be objectively justifiable if "the dominant undertaking has behaved in a
4.6.
proportionate way in defending its legitimate commercial interest." Id.
Second, the copyright will be "essential only if there are no potential substitutes
(through duplication or otherwise)," thus making the facility "indispensable to
the exercise of the activity in question." Id. 4.7. Third, "[cdare must be taken
not to undermine the incentives for undertakings to make future investments
and innovations." Id. T 4.8.
47 The CCS Draft Guideline has recognized that "[bloth intellectual property.
and competition laws share the same basic objective of promoting economic
2.1. However, the Guideline states that "[t]he
efficiency and innovation." Id.
possession of an IPR does not necessarily create market power in itself," which
may mean the CCS is less likely to force a copyright holder to share its product
simply because of market domination. Id. T 2.5.
GUIDELINE ON THE TREATMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS,
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These developments have provided an impetus to advance the
Interface debate by presenting issues and raising questions for
future inquiry. If along the way, the discussion also produces
useful guidelines clarifying the circumstances where access to
copyright content would be essential, then so much the better.
Despite this paper's attempted economic tenor, some legal
discussion is necessary to provide the proper context to
understanding challenges courts have had in balancing
competing interests that often advanced and rebutted in the
relatively esoteric language of economics. Part II offers reasons
why copyright has become subject to competition law regulation
under the EFD. Part III makes a brief survey of seminal cases
where courts in the EU and US have had the unenviable task of
grappling with the esoteric economics of copyright, network
effects and sector specific regulation. It observes that certain
market conditions require a more nuanced approach when
regulating access in order to properly take into account dynamic
efficiencies.
This paper argues that "reasonableness" is a
workable standard for compulsory licensing and highlights the
role of economics in working towards a clear and principled
standard of access to copyrighted works under the EFD. Part IV
summarizes the discussion and concludes with some key
observations.
II. WHY IS COPYRIGHT "ESSENTIAL"?
Owners enjoy copyright on a utilitarian basis. On one hand
lies the owner's right to appropriate his or her investment. 48 On
the other lies the right of the public to access the work whether
for direct consumption or to use its contents to create
complementary or competing works. 49 However, in recent years,
it appears that the growing importance of copyright in national
trade balances and concerns over piracy have spurred developed
countries to push for stronger multilateral and bilateral
commitment to stronger, longer and broader control over access,
use and dissemination of their content. It is suggested that this
may have contributed to courts being more willing to entertain
plaintiffs seeking access on the basis that the copyright is
protecting an "essential facility." 0
& B. SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 29 (2d ed. 2004).
See McGowan, supra note 12, at 773-74.
50 See BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 48, at 258-65 (describing the use of
48 L. BENTLY
49

HeinOnline -- 17 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 494 2007

2007]

COPYRIGHT UNDER SIEGE

A. Expansion into FunctionalWorks
The last century has seen increased political and legal
activities designed to strengthen the various types of protection
for ideas. This may be due to two related reasons. First, a
country offering stronger rights will encourage content owners,
assured of financial returns, to exploit its content in that country
compared to another country that has a high likelihood of free
riders. 51 The US has been the primary mover of the trend toward
stronger rights, and it has acted at two levels. 52 The first level is
multilateral.
Concerns over huge losses sustained by software and database
industries in the US led it to bring IPRs into its international
trade negotiations. 53 Given the ease of copying, copyright gives
software and database owners exclusive rights over reproduction
not found in traditional works, subject to extremely narrow
exceptions.5 4 This was justified on the basis that the author's
compulsory licensing for essential facilities in the EC); Robert Pitofsky et al.,
The Essential FacilitiesDoctrine Under U.S. Antitrust Law, 70 ANTITRUST L.J.
443, 452-53 (2002) (describing the granting of access to assets protected by
copyright under the essential facilities doctrine).
51 See JOHN GURNSEY, COPYRIGHT THEFT 155-56 (Aslib Gower 1995). See also
BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 48, at 45 (noting that "[w]hile the strengthening
of protection has sometimes been explained in terms of legislative convenience,
it also suggests that [there] is at least an implicit agenda [between owners and
lawmakers] to maximize copyright protection.").
52 BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 48, at 6-7.
53 Sam Ricketson, New Wine into Old Bottles: Technological Change and
Intellectual Property Rights, 10 PROMETHEUS 53, 68 (1992). The fact that
existing conventions such as Paris and Berne did not have effective sanctions
and penalties no doubt was an important consideration. As Jessica Litman
explains
[tihe content industries, copyright owners argued, were among the few in
which the United States had a favorable balance of trade. Instead of
focusing on American citizens who engaged in unlicensed uses of
copyrighted works (many of them legal under U.S. law), they drew
Congress's attention to people and businesses in other countries who
engaged in similar uses. The United States should make it a top priority,
they argued, to beef up domestic copyright law at home, and thus ensure
that people in other countries paid for any use of copyrighted works
abroad.
JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 80-81 (Prometheus Books 2001).
54 See BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 48, at 46, 64-65. See also LITMAN,
supra note 53, at 26-27 ("A computer works by reproducing [data] in its volatile
[which] could, at least in theory, be saved
Random Access Memory [(RAM)] ....
to disk . . . ."). Copyright lobbyists used this as a premise to argue that "each
appearance of any portion of [software code] in any computer's [RAM]" is an
infringement of copyright. Id. at 26-27. "That would mean . . . that the
copyright owner has the legal right to control [access] . . . for every single
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reproduction right was fundamental, and the utilitarian basis of
copyright law required that the extent of that right not be
diminished to ensure that future incentives to create are not
stifled.55 Therefore, in recent years, copyright law tailored any
limitations narrowly while at the same time expanding the scope
56
of protected subject matter.
The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights ("TRIPS") 57 is a direct consequence of
technological development and the desire of technologically
TRIPS
advanced nations to protect their IPRs abroad.
represents the high watermark of international consensus on
It extends copyright to "[c]omputer
copyright evolution. 5
programs, whether in source or object code,"59 as well as
compilations of data that constitute intellectual creations
because of selection or arrangement independent of pre-existing
copyright in the material itself.6 0 This follows the US position as
appearance of a work in the memory of any computer anywhere." Id. at 27.
55 LITMAN, supra note 53, at 27.
56 See Council Directive 2001/29/EC, The Harmonisation of Certain Aspects
of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167)
10; Council Directive 91/250/EEC, The Legal Protection of Computer Programs,
1991 O.J. (L 122) 42. In Europe, rights owners have been conferred greater
control over the right of communication to include access on demand and the
right of electronic reproduction. Council Directive 2001/29/EC, supra, It 26, 33.
This makes all reproductions, however transient, liable for infringement. In
Singapore, § 15(1A) of the Copyright Act provides that "[flor the purposes of this
Act, reproduction, in relation to any work, includes the making of a copy which
is transient or is incidental to some other use of the work." Singapore
Copyright Act 1987, c. 63, § 15(1A), [hereinafter Singapore Copyright Act]. The
Copyright Act has not included the equivalent of Article 9(1).
57 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 81
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. The TRIPS Agreement contains seven parts. Id. at
83. Parts I and II contain the substantive law provisions. Id. at 84, 87. Parts
III and IV set forth the procedural standards for acquisition and enforcement of
IPRs under national law. Id. at 99, 106. Part V deals with dispute resolution
using World Trade Organization dispute resolution mechanisms. Id. at 106.
Part VI provides transitional provisions providing selected groups of nations
with additional time to comply with TRIPS. Id. at 107. Part VII establishes
institutional arrangements at the international level for TRIPS compliance,
notably the TRIPS Council. Id. at 108.
58 BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 48, at 9.
59 TRIPS, supra note 57, at 87.
60 Id.
TRIPS lays down the minimum level of protection expected from
member states, which member states have raised through domestic legislation.
Id. at 84-85. Singapore has faithfully incorporated each development in its
Copyright Act. Singapore Copyright Act, supra note 56, §§ 26(1)(a)-(b), 7A(1).
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laid down in by the Supreme Court in Feist Publications,Inc. v.
Rural Telephone Services Co., Inc. 6 1 Recognizing the potential
access bottlenecks that would be caused by allowing database
owners to control access to factual databases based on
investment and effort alone, the Supreme Court ruled that
databases may only be protected through copyright if the owner
expended sufficient skill and judgment in the selection and
arrangement of the content. 62 The Court reasoned that because
facts were not subjectively created but were objectively
discovered, copyright protection could not subsist in mere facts,
no matter how great an investment had been made in their
compilation. 63
Since re-utilization of data is allowed, the
64
alternative forms of expression to other authors are limitless.
Thus in Feist, the Court attempted to balance user rights by
conferring a limited right to the expression original to the author
65
of a work through the copyright regime.
Similarly, a US court in Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland
International,Inc. held that the menu system for "Lotus 1-2-3"
was a method of operation not protected by copyright. 66 The
menu system "serve[d] as the method by which the [underlying
software was] operated and controlled." 6 The policy underlying
499 U.S. 340 (1991).
See id. at 345 ("The sine qua non of copyright is originality. To qualify for
copyright protection, a work must be original to the author. Original, as the
term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created
by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at
least some minimal degree of creativity.") (citations omitted). As Stanley Lai
explains, this requires that "the author must have exercised some choice in
determining an aspect of the form of a work before that part of the form can be
said to have originated from him or her." STANLEY LAL, THE COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 15 (Hart
Publishing 2000).
63 Feist, 499 U.S. at 349.
64 See id. at 363-64.
65 Id.
Singapore seems to have codified the approach taken in Feist,
expressly limiting protection in factual compilations to "the selection or
arrangement of its contents which constitutes an intellectual creation."
Singapore Copyright Act, supra note 56, § 7A(2)(a). Section 7A(2) provides that
copyright that subsists in a compilation is limited to the selection and
arrangement of its contents. Id. For a foreshadowing of this development in
Singapore, see Ng-Loy Wee Loon, Copyright Protection for Traditional
Compilations of Facts and Computerised Databases-Is Sweat Copyrightable?,
1995 SINGAPORE J. LEGAL STUD. 96.
66 Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc. 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995).
67 Id. at 815. Even though expressive choices had been made by Lotus in
choosing and arranging the menu commands, this expression was not
copyrightable because the specific words chosen were necessarily part of a
61
62
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this exclusion was drawn from the utilitarian mandate to
encourage subsequent authors to build upon the efforts of their
predecessors. 68 The court was also influenced by the fact that the
menu commands used in "Lotus 1-2-3" had become an industry
69
standard in the market for computer spreadsheet programs. It
would therefore have been undesirable if copyright could be
acquired, and asserted, in a way that would compel the many
software users who were familiar with the Lotus menu
commands to learn different commands for different spreadsheet
programs. 70 The court was concerned with customers being
"locked into" the Lotus system, such that the cost for customers
to change their practices would be so high that they would not be
likely to buy a competing product that might even be
commercially superior. 71 By allowing Borland to replicate the
"Lotus 1-2-3" interface, customers could opt for the superior
product, thus promoting competition via substitution. 72 In
essence, while the computer program may have deserved
copyright protection, the owner had no basis to impede
competition by imposing unnecessary learning costs upon
consumers. It is important to note that while copyright had
expanded into functional content at this point, a more focused
73
approach was taken to preserve access.
74
The need to curb piracy is closely related to trade issues.
"method of operation." Id. at 816.
68 Id. at 818.
69 Id. at 821.
70 Id. at 817, 818.
Judge Boudin observed that "[i]f Lotus is granted a
monopoly on this pattern, users who have learned the command structure of
Lotus 1-2-3 or devised their own macros are locked into Lotus, just as a typist
who has learned the QWERTY keyboard would be the captive of anyone who
had a monopoly on the production of such a keyboard." Id. at 821 (Boudin, J.,
concurring).
71 See id. at 819-21. See also Willow A. Sheremata, Barriersto Innovation:A
Monopoly, Network Externalities, and the Speed of Innovation, 42 ANTITRUST
BULL. 937, 955 (1997) (describing the market forces that work against a
consumer from purchasing a product that may prove to be more superior
because of a reluctance to switch technologies).
72 Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d at 821.
73 See id. at 818 (describing the method of determining whether a work is
copyrightable, specifically not only whether the work is an original expression
but also whether it fits into one of the categories described in the legislation as
copyrightable).
74 See WILLIAM CORNISH & DAVID LLEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS 359 (5th ed. 2003).

Piracy is understood broadly to include any situation where the owner is not
able to appropriate returns from an expected sale of its work. GURNSEY, supra
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Functional copyrighted works require considerable investment to
be made but are often taken over by others quickly, effectively
and cheaply. 75 The early computer industry was content with
contracts and secrecy. 76 However, the astonishing ability of
digital technology to copy programs and mass consumer markets
for pirated content rapidly reversed this perception. The ease of
instantaneous and perfect duplication of keystone technologies
annuls "the natural lead time" of copyright owners.7 7 This
jeopardizes the ability of first comers to recoup their investments.
This makes the case for stronger copyright hard to resist.
Although states that ascribe to TRIPS are free to provide
stronger IPRs than are provided in TRIPS, TRIPS acts as a
minimum protection. 78 Every roll out of a new technology forces
players in the copyright system to find a new point of equilibrium
between access to protected works and incentives to create new
works. 79 The pressure for increased protection is commonly
directed toward the expansion of existing regimes.80 This is
generally easier from a legislative point of view than creating a
new system. The main attraction of copyright protection is the
fact that it comes about immediately without any requirement to
note 51, at 1, 3.
75 See GURNSEY, supra note 51, at 111-12.
76

Id. at 112.

Daryl Lim Tze Wei, Regulating Access to Databases Through Antitrust
Law: A Missing Perspective in the DatabaseDebate, 2006 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 7,
10, available at http://stlr.stanford.edu/2006/11. For a summary of legislative
reforms aimed at addressing the problems arising from the development of
digital technology in Europe, see Thomas Dreier, Adjustment of Copyright Law
to the Requirements of the Information Society, 29 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRIGHT L. (IIC) 623 (1998).
For a US perspective, see generally PAUL
77

GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX

163-185 (rev. ed. 2003), and LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE
OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD

177-199 (Random House 2001).

Wei, supra note 77,
3 (citing Council Directive 96/9, 1996 O.J. (L77) 20
(EC)). Article 3(1) of TRIPS, which requires member nations to give no less
favourable rights to their nationals as to nationals in other member nations,
applies to IPRs that are set out in Sections 1 through 7 of Part II of TRIPS.
TRIPS, supra note 57, at 85, 87-98. There may be an argument that the new
sui generis right is outside of Part II and therefore not subject to national
treatment principles. It is possible that the reciprocity provisions may be
challenged under TRIPS on the basis of a most favoured nation argument.
79 See 78 PARL. DEB. H. (1st Sess.) (2004) (Sing.) (statement of Prof. S.
Jayakumar).
80 See 78 PARL. DEB. H. (1st Sess.) (2004) (Sing.) (statement of Zainudin
Nordin) (stating that "copyright protection has to keep up with the fast paced
developments of the IT sector ....
The proposed amendments are intended to
keep [Singapore's] Copyright Act relevant in the digital age.").
78
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formally apply for it.81 For a product that is invariably dynamic
and relatively short lived, the long lead-in time to granting a
patent-to say nothing of the disclosure requirements-is clearly
unacceptable. Patent protection creates problems for an industry
based on derivative innovation.8 2
Most programs will be
"original," but few will be "novel" and "inventive."8 3
It is
therefore not surprising that many technological developments
seek protection in copyright. Yet ironically, in granting copyright
over functional software interfaces, the law may have
inadvertently granted patent-like rights.
As Stanley Lai
observed, "[t]he inherent functionality of computer software
advances a utilitarian raison d'etre, that to accord it broad
copyright protection may permit patent-like monopolisation of
valuable processes without satisfying the more demanding
84
prerequisites of patent law."
There has also been growing support for copyright
81 GURNSEY,
82 Id. That

supra note 51, at 111.

is not to say that patents are irrelevant. Computer programs
may well be patentable as an invention so long as they meet certain additional
standards such as having a "technical character." EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE,
COMPUTER-IMPLEMENTED INVENTIONS AND PATENTS: LAW AND PRACTICE AT THE

PATENT
OFFICE,
http://cii.european-patent-office.org/pdf/cii_
brochureen.pdf (last visited June 5, 2007). Other legal vehicles may also have
a role to play in safeguarding computer programs. These include the law of
confidential information and the law of contract. Ronald B. Standler, What is
Computer Law? (1999), www.rbs2.com/cdefn.htm; Gary S. Morris, Computer
Security and the Law, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/secpubs/cslaw.txt (last
visited June 5, 2007). However, the focus is on the role played by copyright.
See Standler, supra. Source codes, object codes in ROM chips and
documentation are protected as literary works under Section 7A(1) of the
Singapore Copyright Act. See Singapore Copyright Act, supra note 56.
83 Both novelty and inventiveness are necessary for patent while originality
is the only requirement for copyright. Singapore Patents Act, 2002, c. 221, §§
13-15 (Singapore), available at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg (search for "Patent
Act") [hereinafter Singapore Patent Act].
There are other reasons why
computer programs will likely meet the criteria for copyright but not patents.
Unlike the work for patents, computer program work is kept secret, failing to
activate competitive dynamics that come from diffusion of knowledge and
challenging of validity. Second, there is no requirement of use or threat of
revocation for non-use. See Singapore Patent Act, supra, § 80. Third, there is
no obligation to grant licenses to authors of derivative works. See id. § 53.
Fourth, copyright is not subject to exhaustion. See generally Eugene R. Quinn,
Jr.,
Exhaustion
Doctrine,
http://nys-stlc.syr.edu/lawlibrary/
antitrust/exhaustion.aspx (last visited June 5, 2007) (describing the exhaustion
doctrine as the "control of downstream uses of products covered by an
underlying piece of intellectual property protection.").
84 Lai, supra note 62, at 7. Similarly, the author observes that the British
Software Directive "skirts perilously close to protecting ideas." Id. at 14.
EUROPEAN
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protection of databases.
A recent report on scientific and
technical databases describes their importance.85 Because of new
advances in technology databases, creators face greater
competition due to the speed with which database contents can
86
be replicated.
This results in a suboptimal level of investment in research
and development that the law has attempted to address through
stronger database protection.
To the extent that the law
protecting investment in databases increases their production, it
serves to enhance society's problem-solving abilities through a
comprehensive compilation of information. It also increases
productivity, advances education and training, and facilitates the
creation of a better informed citizenry through the ease of
87
informational access.
Therefore, there still exists a need for database rights in
today's world; however, the scope of the rights to confer is the
88
question.
89
In the decade since the EU adopted its Database Directive,
85 COMM. FOR A STUDY ON PROMOTING ACCESS TO SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL

DATA FOR THE PUB. INTEREST, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
BALANCE: PRIVATE RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN

A

QUESTION OF
SCIENTIFIC AND

DATABASES
(1999), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/
0309068258/html/17.html [hereinafter A QUESTION OF BALANCE]. The Report
was based, in part, on a workshop held in Washington D.C. on January 14-15,
1999 in Washington D.C. See Proceedings of the Workshop on Promoting
Access to Scientific and Technical Data for the Public Interest: An Assessment
of Policy Options, available at http://books.nap.edu/html/proceedings-sci tech.
The committee noted "almost every aspect of the natural world, human activity,
and indeed every life form can be observed and captured in an electronic
database." A QUESTION OF BALANCE, supra, at 17. In terms of the economic
effect of databases, "[t]here is barely a sector of the economy that is not
significantly engaged in the creation and exploitation of digital databases, and
there are many-such as insurance, banking, or direct marketing-that are
completely database dependent." Id. "[Flrom 1975 through 2001 the number of
database[s] has grown from 301 to 12,111 and the number of records has
increased from 52 million to 16.86 billion. During the same period, the number
of database producers has grown from 200 to 3879." Samuel E. Trosow,
Information for Society: Towards a Critical Theory of Intellectual Property
Policy 114 (2002) (unpublished thesis, University of California, Los Angeles),
available at http://publish.uwo.ca/-strosow/TrosowDissertation.pdf
(citing
Martha E. Williams, The State of Databases Today: 2001, in GALE DIRECTORY
OF DATABASES xx (2002).
86 Wei, supra note 77,
10.
TECHNICAL

87 Id.
88 Id.

89 See Council Directive 96/9/EC, The Legal Protection of Databases, 1996
O.J.
(L
77)
20,
available
at
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/legreg/docs/969ec.html.
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signatories to TRIPS have had strong cause to consider its
implications on protection for functional works. In particular,
the EU has extended protection to databases containing
unoriginal content based solely on the investment of labor and
resources by the creator. 90 The database right allowed the
database owner to prevent extraction and reutilization of
database content. In certain cases they may also prevent the
systematic extraction and/or reutilization of insubstantial
parts."91 The effect of acknowledging these rights is to virtually
extend copyright protection to factual materials that had
historically been denied copyright protection. 92 The protection of
databases and software has also found sanctuary in the World
Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty.9 3 More
recently, the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement ("USSFTA")
has provided for one of the highest levels of IP protection in the
world. 94 In addition to obligations to promote anti-circumvention
measures and transmission rights, 95 the USSFTA requires
90 Wei, supranote 77, 3.
91 In particular, the database right prevented "extraction and reutilization of
a whole or a substantial part, evaluated qualitatively and/or quantitatively, of
the content of that database. In certain cases they may also prevent the
systematic extraction and/or reutilization of insubstantial parts." See id.
92 Id. See also Hassan A. Deveci, Databases:Is Sui Generis a Stronger Bet
Than Copyright?, 12 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 178, 187-188 (2004) (describing
pre- and post-Feist requirements of compilations of facts in order to be
copyrightable).
93 WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 4-5, Dec. 20, 1996, 112 Stat. 2860, 1991 O.J.
(L 122) 42, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocswo033.html (stating in article 4 that "[clomputer programs are protected as
literary works within the meaning of Article 2 of the Berne Convention. Such
protection applies to computer programs, whatever may be the mode or form of
their expression," and in article 5 that "[c] ompilations of data or other material,
in any form, which by reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents
constitute intellectual creations, are protected as such. This protection does not
extend to the data or the material itself and is without prejudice to any
copyright subsisting in the data or material contained in the compilation.").
94 See

INDUSTRY

FUNCTIONAL

ADVISORY

COMMITTEE

ON

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR TRADE POLICY MATTERS, THE U.S.-SINGAPORE FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT (FTA): THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROVISIONS 4 (2003), available

http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore_FTA/
at
Reports/asset uploadjfile273_3234.pdf; U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement:
Hearing Before the U.S. InternationalTrade Commission (2003) (statement of
Eric H. Smith, President, International Intellectual Property Alliance),
availableat http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id-article=483.
95 See United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., ch. 12,
117
Stat. 948, available at
art. 16.4, § 7(a), May 6, 2003,
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore-FTA/SectionIndex
.html (click "Final Text," then click "Text of the Agreement") [hereinafter
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Singapore to extend the copyright term to TRIPS-plus levels of
96
life plus 70 years.
It may be argued that if an imbalance has been caused by
overbroad copyright, the solution lies with a more circumspect
legislature, sensitive to calibrating copyright to produce optimal
innovation. But there is a problem. The optimal amount of
protection for innovation is unknown. At least some copyright
protection is necessary to encourage innovation. Up to a point
the trade-off is positive-that is, as protection increases, the
marginal social gains from innovation are greater than the
marginal losses from enforcement of exclusionary rights and the
However, it is
transaction costs of negotiating licenses.
important to understand that the relationship between copyright
protection and innovation is not monotonic. 97 Whatever the
USSFTA]. In the EU, according to the Directive on the Harmonisation of
Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society (the
"InfoSoc Directive"), even the reproduction by private individuals of a web page
for non-commercial purposes will trigger a compulsory levy. See Council
Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 56, arts. 33-35. In this respect, the InfoSoc
Directive would appear to be providing rights holders with an exclusive right to
control access to information, i.e., the right to read, a sphere that copyright has
never previously attempted to regulate.
96 USSFTA, supra note 95, art. 16.4, § 4. At its inception in 1710, the British
Statute of Anne conferred copyright protection to the author for 21 years from
first publication; but if the book was already written but not yet published, a
protection of 14 years would be given. British Copyright Act, 1710, 8 Ann., c.
19, §§ 1-2, available at http://www.copyrighthistory.com/anne.html. In 1814,
the term of statutory right was extended to 28 years or the author's life,
whichever was longer. T. Gallagher, Copyright, Compulsory Licensing and
Incentives, 11 n.41 (Oxford Intellectual Property Research Center, Working
Paper No. 2, 2001), available at http://www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/EJWP0201.pdf. The
Berne Convention requirement of life plus 50 years was mirrored in the
requirements in TRIPS. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works art. 7(1), July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs wo001.html#P138_25087;
World Trade Organization, TRIPS: A More Detailed Overview of the TRIPS
(last
http://www.wto.orglenglishl/tratop e/trips-e/intel2_e.htm
Agreement,
visited June 5, 2007).
97 A failure to acknowledge this limit is one of the flaws in R. Polk Wagner's
recent argument that there is no reason to worry about ever-increasing control
over intellectual property. See R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free:
Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995,
997 (2003). Wagner argues that since control over intellectual property is
imperfect, increasing intellectual property rights will encourage new creation
that will have spillover benefits to the public. Id. at 997, 1005, 1022. While
this is certainly true up to a point, beyond a certain level of control the costs of
marginal increases in control outweigh any such benefits. See id. at 1011-12
(describing the diminishing marginal returns of additional copyright
protections). Wagner simply assumes that point has not been reached. Id. at
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merits of extending copyright protection to digital works,
enhancing protection has diminishing marginal benefits, and at
some point will cause a net negative impact on innovation, as the
strengthening of existing rights stifles more new innovation
which builds on those rights than that which further expansion
encourages. Thus, as shown in Figure 1 below, the relationship
between the two resembles an inverted "U".
It has been noted that "there are extremely few empirical
studies made on the [proper scope] of copyright."8 The Society
for Economic Research on Copyright Issues ("SERCI") is an
important institutional step in the right direction, but more is
required.9 9 Copyright markets have evolved into an area with
complex sector-specific considerations.
Copyright may not
merely pose a legal barrier to market entry to the market. 100 It

Innovation

Fig. 1: An inverted 'U'
curve showing the
relationship between the
strength of copyright
protection and the

innovation it promotes.

_

_

_

_

_

Strength of
Copyright

may also reinforce structural barriers caused by the market
itself.10 ' In copyright industries, a popular theory is that network
1012. It is submitted that there is substantial evidence to the contrary.
98 ESTELLE DERCLAYE, AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO WHAT THE CONDITIONS OF
A DOMINANT POSITION OF COPYRIGHT SHOULD BE 4, 18 (2003),
www.serci.org/2003/derclaye.pdf.
99 Id. at 4. See, e.g., IvAN PNG, COPYRIGHT: A PLEA FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 2
(2006), availableat http://www.serci.org/documents.html (noting that "there has
been a substantial volume of theoretical research into copyright. This has
pointed to many empirical issues surrounding the fundamental trade-off.
However, there has been relatively little empirical research, hence major
questions remain open.").
100 Id. at 6, 8-9, 18, 24.
101 See id. at 3-4 (explaining how intangible items can cause the market to
fail).
ABUSE OF
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effects form a key barrier. 102
B. Copyright and Network Effects
Network effects are found in both database and software
markets. 10 3 However, thus far successful allegations that they
are an anticompetitive barrier to entry have been limited to the
latter. As an illustration, in the US Microsoft cases, a critical
issue was whether Microsoft was able to perpetuate its market
power by taking advantage of its "applications barrier to
entry."104 With over 90% of the Operating System ("OS")
market, 0 5 Microsoft had an installed base, encouraging software
vendors to write compatible programs for its Windows OS.106
This installed base made it difficult for rival OS software
providers to enter. 0 7 Few programmers would invest time and
money developing applications for OS that do not have a large
installed base because demand for such applications is low,
making rival OS unattractive. 0 8 Simultaneously, Windows OS
users are unlikely to switch to other systems, because Windows
allows them to choose from among a much larger number of
compatible applications. 0 9 Consumers are also reluctant to
switch to new networks because of investments in hardware and
time spent learning a system. 110 Brand name recognition and the
consumer confidence it inspires may be even more powerful
barriers preventing entry in information platform industries
where consumers rely heavily on suppliers for continuing
support.
102 See Wagner, supra note 97, at 1014.
103 See, e.g., Case C-418/01, IMS Health

GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health

GmbH & Co. KG, 2004 E.C.R. 1-5039, available at http://curia.eu.int/en/content/
juris/index.htm (database); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9
(D.D.C. 1999) (software).
104 Microsoft Corp., supra note 103, at 27.
105 See id. at 19 ("Every year for the last decade, Microsoft's share of the
market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems has stood above ninety
percent.").
106 See id. at 19-20.
107 See id. at 22 (describing IBM's inability to gain support for its OS/2 Warp
operating system because of Microsoft's market dominance).
108

Id. at 20.

See also David J. Teece & Mary Coleman, The Meaning of Monopoly:
Antitrust Analysis in High-Technology Industries, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 801, 814
(1998) ("[Tlhe more users of a given [computer operating] platform, the more
complementary goods that will likely be supplied to that platform. This will
lower the cost or increase the value of the platform.").
110 Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 15.
109 Id.
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The result is a "positive feedback" process in which more and
more applications are written for Windows."1
Thus network
effects exert a strong influence on software developers' and
consumers' choices. 112
As Figure 2 shows, once network
saturation occurs, consumers are likely to remain with an
established network because of the costs they have incurred in
adapting to the network, and costs involved in switching to
another one.1 13 These "switching costs" thus create substantial
barriers to entry in digital markets.11 4 Because the "switching
costs" for consumers in network markets are so high, they
115
become "locked in" to Microsoft's network.

Saturation

Time

111 Id. at 20.
112 Id.
As pointed out in a decision by a Commission of the European
Communities' decision, "[tihe exploitation of those network effects with a view
of leveraging [Microsoft's] quasi-monopoly . . .is at the root of the identified
abuse of refusal to supply .... ." Commission Decision (EC) in Case COMP/C3/37.792/EC of 24 Mar. 2004,
533, available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/
competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf.
113 Teece & Coleman, supra note 109, at 828-29.
These include the
compatible software foregone, the interoperability with users of that network
and time involved in learning that platform in the first place. Id.
114 See id.
115 John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Antitrust on Internet Time: Microsoft
and the Law and Economics of Exclusion, 7 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 157, 170 (1999)
("Software vendors tend to write applications for the most popular operating
system. The greater availability of applications in turn induces new users to
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Simultaneously, consumers' demand for one compatible
technical standard leads network markets to move from the joint
existence of two or more incompatible products to coalesce
around a single standard.116 Hence, once copyrighted, the digital
content gains enough acceptance to be perceived by most
consumers as the ultimate technological winner, the market
117
"tips," and consumers migrate to that standard en masse.
Early users of a particular network often join in anticipation of
other users hopping on the bandwagon later. 118 This is seen in
Figure 3 below.

choose that operating system. The market thus tips in favor of a single
standard, to which the industry is locked in.").
116 See David Balto & Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and High-Tech Industries:
The New Challenge, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 583, 604 (1998) ("In industries
characterized by networks, even monopoly is seen by some observers as
inevitable and merely an accommodation to consumer demand for a compatible
technical standard."); Daniel L. Rubinfield, Deputy Attorney Gen., Antitrust
Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Competition, Innovation and Antitrust Enforcement
in Dynamic Network Industries, Address at the Software Publishers
Association
Spring
Symposium
(Mar.
24,
1998),
available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1611.htm ("With consumer preferences
for uniformity in products and compatibility in complementary products,
dominant firms operating with a single standard are likely to develop in
dynamic network industries."); Steve Lohr, Open Windows: The New Math of
Monopoly, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2000, at 41 ("[Network markets] tend to naturally
evolve toward one or two dominant companies (think Cisco in routers for
Internet data or eBay in online auctions").
They control the technology
standards in their markets.").
117 See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Could Java Change Everything?
The Competitive Proprietyof a ProprietaryStandard,43 ANTITRUST BULL. 715,
721 (1998) ("[Once consumers perceive that a de facto standard has been
established, tipping will occur very quickly.").
118 Sheremata, supra note 71, at 958. Controversial examples of tipping
include VHS versus Beta videocassette formats and QWERTY and Dvorak
keyboard layouts.
Id.; STAN J. LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, THE
ECONOMICS OF QWERTY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND POLICY 45 (2002).
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100

Battle zone

50

Fig 3: Positive feedback leading to market tipping;
Source: CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN,
INFORMATION RULES 177 (MIT Press 1999).

Tipping can occur rapidly because of network effects. 119
Consumers become "locked in" to the product because of
switching costs associated with moving from one network to
another. 120 The net result is that the product technology
standard that is adopted can mean that inferior products
continue to dominate production decisions and consumer
purchases. 21 Even if a new entrant promises a less expensive or
technically superior product, users of the current network may
not be willing to run the risk of losing their investments in that
network. 2 This consequence is sometimes referred to as "path
123
dependency."
Courts and competition authorities adopting dynamic efficiency
goals strive to provide the means for alternative products to be
offered through mandating access to market standards protected
119 KEVIN KELLY, NEW RULES FOR THE NEW ECONOMY: 10 RADICAL STRATEGIES

FOR A CONNECTED

WORLD

34 (Viking 1998); see also ILKKA RAHNASTO,

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, EXTERNAL EFFECTS AND ANTI-TRUST
LEVERAGING IPRs IN THE COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 183-84 (Oxford

LAW:

Univ.

Press 2003).

120 KELLY, supra note 119, at 124.
121 Lemley & McGowan, supra note 117, at 723-24.
122 KELLY, supra note 119, at 124.
123 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw 250 (2d ed. 2001)

("This is the issue of
'path dependence': an industry may be stuck with an inferior technology
because of the cost advantage of the existing network.").
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by copyright in order to ensure that the dynamic welfare gains
promised by sacrificing static efficiencies are obtained. 124 There
is no guarantee that the superior platform would win, given the
incumbent's first mover advantages and its likelihood for
aggressive competitiveness. Once the market has tipped it may
be difficult or even undesirable to undo any anticompetitive
effects that have arisen.
The prospect that a single firm, controlling a key input, can
protect a dominant position, or extend its dominance into new
areas, raises a number of anticompetitive concerns. Copyright in
functional works may persist beyond its useful economic life
because copyright monopolies possess inherent natural
advantages that make them "difficult to dislodge." 125 When the
copyright owner is well entrenched, it may not feel compelled to
continue to pursue efficiencies,' 1 26 and is more likely to engage in
harmful monopolistic conduct, including raising prices, impeding
innovation and reducing output. 127 Tipping may encourage
exploitation of locked-in consumers or fail to innovate and yet
stifle future innovation by preventing switching to better
alternative technologies.1 2s
Even if the industry structure
ultimately relies on a single standard, competition policy should
still allow rival standards to battle it out in the marketplace.
Even if it were true that successful copyright owners are often
aggressive in price and innovation, competition is still necessary,
if only because it is likely that consumers would be better off
with several aggressive companies, rather than a single

124 See generally RAHNASTO, supra note 119, at 185-99.
125 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ENTERING THE 21ST CENTURY: COMPETITION
POLICY IN THE WORLD OF B2B ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACES, Part 3 at 29 (2000),

http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/10/b2breport.pdf ("[Olnce a marketplace monopoly is
attained, it may be very difficult to dislodge.").
126 United States v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 342 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) ("The higher the barriers to entry, and the longer the lags before new
entry, the less likely it is that potential entrants would be able to enter the
market in a timely, likely, and sufficient scale to deter or counteract any
anticompetitive restraints. Where barriers to entry are high, . . . a monopolist
would find it easier to raise prices because it would be unlikely that a
competitor would, or could, enter the market.") (citations and internal
quotations omitted). Editorial, Beltway on Top, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2000, at
A18 ("The only incentive to produce anything is the possession of temporary
monopoly power....').
127 See VISA U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d at 340 (describing some of the
monopolistic conduct Visa engaged in).
128 RAHNASTO, supra note 119, at 183-85.
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dominant firm. 129 Moreover, in addition to maintaining the
possibility of competition on quality, rival standards also hedge
against the risk that the owner's standard proves fundamentally
flawed.
Therefore, the feasibility of challenging an existing network
monopolist becomes critical. Courts and CEOs act to prevent

consumers from being "locked in."

130

Rivals have to duplicate the

network to enter the market, significantly increasing entry
costs. 13 1 Competition law prevents the copyright owner from
exploiting bottlenecks through mandating access to interface
information. 132 Similarly, competition law may also intervene ex
ante to prevent premature tipping to a possibly inefficient
standard. 133 Given the seemingly awesome market power at the
copyright owner's disposal, there seems little reason why
competition, ex ante or ex post tipping, should not be promoted by
requiring access to the owner's copyrighted works.
C. Copyright as a Block to Innovation
Copyright in functional work exists primarily for the functions
they perform and not because of any elegance in expression. The
consumer is not concerned with the computer coding that make
up his program, only whether it works efficiently, effectively and
in a user-friendly manner. 134 Similarly, a database is only as
good as the veracity of its contents. Two important consequences
follow the mutation of copyright in functional works. The first is
that copyrighted works become non-substitutable and therefore
an "essential" competitive input. 135 A second related outcome is
that as technological innovation becomes more dependent on
prior work, as well as current developments, strong copyright in

129

Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for

Invention, republished in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK BEARING 144, 156-60

(Markham Publishing Co. 1971).
130 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 15 (D.D.C.
1999).
131 RAHNASTO, supra note 119, at 31.
132 Id. at 188-89.
133 Id. at 182.
134 See Software & Systems Engineering Standards Committee, Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers, SP-01 User Expectations, available at
http://standards.computer.org/sesc/s2esc-pols/SP-01 _UserExpectations.htm
(last visited June 5, 2007) (describing expectations of software purchasers and
users).
135 See BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 48, at 64.
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13 6
functional works may retard the innovation process.

1.

Non-Substitutability of Functional Content

In the beginning, copyright protection extended to the
expression of creative intellectual content and not the content
itself.137 Copyright was thus an alienable and temporary right to
economically exploit expression in creative works that, upon
expiry of the legal term of protection, falls into the public
domain. 138 It was also comprised of an inalienable moral right to
claim authorship and object to any derogation of his work in a
139
manner that would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
While copyright created a legal monopoly, it did not necessarily
create an economic monopoly unless the scope of the copyright is
co-extensive with the scope of the relevant market. Because of
the exceptions and limitations built into copyright law, there are
140
normally substitutes.
Id. at 265.
See TRIPS, supra note 57, art. 9(2) ("Copyright protection shall extend to
expressions and not to ideas . . ... "). Thus, objective justification afforded by
copyright must only be valid to the extent that the third parties' use in fact
infringes on copyright. See id. In the US, copyright is firmly grounded with the
aim of favoring the general public interest, as demonstrated in the US
Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."). Copyright does
not extend to ideas, facts, functional elements, scenes a faire, or unoriginal
portions of a work. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000); Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 356 (1991).
Conversely, in the [United Kingdom] and therefore most Commonwealth
countries, where copyright is based on the protection of investment and not
really on the promotion of science and the arts ... and especially where a
law of unfair competition is [non]existent, therefore creating a lack of
protection, copyright's provisions are generally relatively protective (see
e.g. low originality requirement (skill, judgement and labour), unclear
recognition of the idea/expression dichotomy . . . fair dealing less broad
than the US fair use). Finally, in civil law countries, whose copyright laws
are based on natural law and the sacrosanct notion of author and 'the work
of his/her mind', copyright protection is generally the strongest (except for
the relatively high requirement of originality, rights are broad and
exceptions are generally numerous but very narrow).
Derclaye, AN ECONOMIC APPROACH, supra note 98, at 22-23.
138 Berne Convention, supra note 96, arts. 9(1), 18(2).
139 Id. at 6bis(1).
140 Hence, the inordinate successes of Dan Brown's book, The Da Vinci Code,
was not dampened by the infringement suit brought against it by the authors of
Holy Blood Holy Grail, an earlier book allegedly encapsulating the same ideas,
since the copyright for their book did not prevent other similar and competing
books from entering and remaining in the market. See Baigent v. The Random
136
137

HeinOnline -- 17 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 511 2007

ALB. L.J. SC. & TECH.

[Vol. 17

However, copyright is a pliable tool, shaped by firms with an
eye toward disadvantaging competitors through raising entry
barriers. The easy manner in which copyright arises over
functional works makes it possible for firms to get copyrights
over arbitrary but non-substitutable interfaces or raw
information generated by the owner.14 1 This extension raises a
danger that database owners may impede the use of information
in derivative markets or by rivals in the same market to produce
competing products, since they may be conferred a de facto
monopoly on the information. An example of this is the seminal
EU case of Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission of the European
Communities ("Magill").142 In Magill, three TV stations were
dominant over the listings of their own programs and enjoyed
copyright protection. 143
When Magill started to publish
comprehensive weekly listings for all three stations, each TV
station successfully sued for copyright infringement.14 4
The
stations had never supplied the information to other companies
before. 145 Yet the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") found that
this amounted to an abuse of a dominant position over the
program information. 146 This was because each TV station
enjoyed a de facto monopoly over the lists of its own programs,
and it was the only source of information that was essential to
Magill. 47 This prevented the appearance of a "new product" that
the TV stations did not offer, and gave rise to "exceptional
House Group Ltd., No. HC04C03092, 2006 WL 1020604, [2006] EWHC 719 (Ch)
(Eng.). The judge noted that even if the literary themes were copied they were
"too general or of too low a level of abstraction to be capable of protection by
copyright law." The Davinci Code: Case Summary, BOULT WADE TENNANT
BULLETIN, May 2006, available at http://www.boult.com/information/Bulletin
Details.cfm?BulletinID=117; Baigent, 2006 WL 1020604, 245.
141 See infra Part II.A.
142 Case C 241-242/91P, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Comm'n (Magill), 1995
E.C.R. 1-743, 4 C.M.L.R. 718, 789, 790 (1995) (EC).
143 Id. at 726-27.
144 Id. at 727.
145 Id. at 782.
146 Id. at 785-86. In an earlier case, the ECJ intriguingly reached an
opposite conclusion: the refusal to supply to eliminate competition was not an
abuse, as the right to restrain third parties from exploiting the design for front
wing Volvo car panels "constitutes the very subject-matter of his exclusive
right." Case 238/87, AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd., 1988 E.C.R. 6211, . 8.
In that case, the ECJ opined that arbitrary refusal to supply, price fixing or
ceasing production for goods where there was still a potential consumer demand
may amount to abuse. Id. 9.
147 Magill, 4 C.M.L.R. at 789-90.
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circumstances" that warranted mandatory access to the stations'
148
copyrighted content.
The sole source problem is a very real one. When a database is
truly a sole source database, then fact and expression of fact are
one and the same. Database users need to interact freely with
and transform databases in the course of their research.
Database rights would potentially disrupt this pattern of
usage. 149 Researchers do not simply face increased costs, a
problem that may be ameliorated through increased funding. It
has been argued that the real problem is much deeper, going to
the ability to actually use the database to its highest potential,
that is, in an interactive and transformative manner. 1 0 The user
is reduced to a mere consumer of a product that may be accessed
and read only on a pay-per basis. The former ability to reutilize
the data, combine it with other data, and store it for later use is
15 1
lost. This entrenches established dominant firms.
Similar concerns exist in software industries. A product
dominating a software market may not always reflect greater
efficiency or quality; its dominance may simply be due to random
circumstances and sometimes to shrewd marketing and
advertising options that can hardly be associated with
meritorious competition. 152 The copyright owner can choose to

148 Id. at 790. The ECJ's judgment was extremely vague. The precise scope
of "exceptional circumstances" remains unknown even to this day. Whether
this was because of a shrewd desire to preserve wiggle room to refine the
conditions for access or otherwise will remain for all time is a matter for
academic speculation.
149 See Samuel E. Trosow, Sui Generis DatabaseLegislation: A Critical
Analysis, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 534, 631 (2005) ("Characterizing a measure as a
Misappropriations Act with a broad 'making available in commerce' right
neither changes this dynamic nor mitigates the interference with the
transformative uses of databases.").
150 See Bernt Hugenholtz, Abuse of Database Right Sole-Source Information
Banks Under the EU DatabaseDirective, Paper presented at Antitrust, Patent
and Copyright Conference, Jan. 15-16, 2004, available at http://www.ivir.nl/
publications/hugenholtz/abuseofdatabaseright.html (describing changing and
manipulating data within a protected database may or may not allow protection
for the newly reformatted information).
151 Trosow, supra note 149, at 630 (noting that "even if a monopoly position
were only temporary, the results would be significant, as the rapid pace of
scientific research in industries [requiring a common pool of information] would
nonetheless be slowed.").
152 Rudolph J.R. Peritz, Dynamic Efficiency and US Antitrust Policy, in POSTCHICAGO DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST LAW 108, 119, 122 (Antonio Cucinotta et
al. eds., 2002).
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design an arbitrary standard and make it extraordinarily
The incumbent chooses a set of
expensive to duplicate.
permutations at no cost, but an entrant will face high costs if it
must independently recreate the code.
In February 1998, Sun Microsystems lodged a complaint before
the European Competition Commission accusing Microsoft of
breaching competition rules by denying access to essential
information on its Windows Personal Computer Operating
System ("PCOS"). 153 After a gestation period of 5 years, Microsoft
v. Commission ("Microsoft (EU)") was born.15 4 The Commission
found that Microsoft had disrupted previous patterns of
cooperation when full interface information had been made
available. 155 The result was that buying a workgroup server
equipped with a non-Microsoft OS meant lower network
156
performance because desktops were equipped with Windows.
Developers of complementary software for servers expected
157
Microsoft's WGSOS to win and ported their applications for it.
Customers in turn bought Microsoft's WGSOS because more
applications were available, tipping the market in favour of
15
Microsoft's WGSOS. 8
Commission Decision, supra note 112, § 2.1.
EUs Statement on End of Microsoft Investigation, CNET NEWS.COM, Mar.
http://m.news.com/EUs+statement+on+end+of+Microsoft+
24,
2004,
investigation/2163-1014_3-5178465.html.
155 See Commission Decision, supra note 112, § 6.2.1.1.1. The Commission
also found that Microsoft had abused its dominant position by tying Windows
Media Player to Windows OS. See KoRAH, supra note 35, at 156-57. ""When
Microsoft first entered the [Work Group Server Operating System ("WGSOS")
market ... [i]ts software for servers was then inferior to that of its competitors."
KORAH, supra note 35, at 156. At this point, "it supplied full interface
information" (protected by various IPRs, including copyright) to enable
competitors' servers to wrok well with its Windows WGSOS and PCOS. Id.
This enabled Microsoft to sell more Windows OS licenses, thereby increasing its
value. Id. It in turn created direct and indirect network effects bolstering
Microsoft's market power in its client PCOS as more people used its WGSOS.
See id. Once Microsoft had gained sufficient market share, it diminished its
level of disclosure in the workgroup server market, making rival products less
able to take advantage of the PCOS functions compared to its own workgroup
OS. Id.; see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19, 33
(D.D.C. 1999).
156 See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 14-15.
157 See id. at 20.
158 KORAH, supra note 35, at 152. According to the Commission, neither
reverse engineering, nor open industry standards, nor the access ensured by the
communication licensing program created in the US are alternative ways for
Microsoft competitors to achieve interoperability of their products. Commission
Decision, supra note 112, at 5.3.1.2.3.1, .3, .4. In addition, the Commission
153
154
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As a "superdominant" undertaking, 159 Microsoft was therefore
using its market power to exclude competition and destroying the
incentive for competitors to innovate. "In the past, [competitors
in the WGSOS market] had introduced new features" to meet
However, if they now did not have
consumer demand.160
interface protocols for Windows, there was no point in investing
in innovation that they could not use, but could only sell to
Microsoft for it to meet that demand. 6 1 Further, withholding
interface information needed to design competing programs
locked consumers into Microsoft's server market, with the result
162
of perpetuating an inefficient standard.
In an interim hearing, the Court of First Instance ("CFI")
upheld the Commission's fine of nearly €500 million, the largest
ever imposed on a single firm. 163 However, what was perhaps
more devastating was the affirmation of the order for Microsoft to
disclose interface information on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms to competitors to enable the WGSOS of
64
rivals to achieve full interoperability with Microsoft's PCOS.
This order covered past, present and future Microsoft products
without any time limitation. 165 This means that Microsoft must
continually update this information as it brings to market new
versions of its products. This remedy has been criticised as
"extraordinary," both in terms of the significant loss in the
strategic value of its copyright and in the fact that competition
authorities are involved in determining how much a company

pointed out that Microsoft ultimately could upgrade its operating system so as
to destroy the compatibility achieved by its rivals through their reverse
engineering efforts. Id. at 5.3.1.2.3.3.
159 See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 19 (explaining that Microsoft, with its
market shares of over 90 per cent, occupies almost the whole market; it
therefore approaches a position of complete monopoly, and can be said to hold
an overwhelmingly dominant position).
160 KORAH, supra note 35, at 155.
161 See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 28 (arguing that multiple actions taken
by Microsoft could only be explained as an attempt to protect its monopoly
power).
162 Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 33-34. It should be recognized from the onset
that in the Commission's own case against Microsoft, the Commission took
great care in preparing its case, even subjecting the file to peer-review. KORAH,
supra note 35, at 166.
26,
163 Case T-201/04 R, Microsoft v. Commission, 2004 E.C.R. 11-2977,
478 (EC), available at http://curia.eu.int/en/content/juris/index.htm.
164 Id.
[ 27-30.
165 Id.
28.

HeinOnline -- 17 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 515 2007

ALB. L.J. SC. & TECH.

516

[Vol. 17

should supply. 166 The appeal was heard on April 24-26, and
Microsoft's request to suspend the sanctions was dismissed.167
The dominant copyright owner may have no incentive to
charge downstream customers the monopoly price for access.
Indeed, it has to charge the competitive price in the secondary
market to avoid the problem of double marginalization. 16s A
rational owner would simply prefer to refuse access and earn
monopoly profits in a primary market rather than opening
competition in a secondary market. Closing competition in the
secondary market further allows it an important advantage. It
can control rate and direction of innovation. This strategic
holdup is especially effective in industries with cumulative
innovation. 169 Empirical evidence exists that suggests that firms
are creating intellectual property portfolios mainly for the
purposes of opportunistic behavior. 170 Firms thus use copyright
as market locks to create entry barriers and raise switching
costs. 171

166

See Ian S. Forrester, Article 82: Remedies in Search of Theories?, 28

FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 919, 931 (2005) (distinguishing Microsoft from Syfait v.

GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) in that it "represents the most expansive inroad of EC
competition law enforcement into the protection of [IPRs] in Community legal
history.").
Under Syfait, "GSK, a pharmaceutical company, is under an
affirmative duty to supply unlimited orders from wholesalers active in the trade
of certain prescription drugs from low-price to high-priced Member States." Id.
at 927.
167 Microsoft, Legal Update, http://www.microsoft.com/freedomtoinnovate/
legalissues/default.aspx (last visited June 5, 2007). This parallels proceedings
in the US, where the US Department of Justice asserted that Microsoft's
conduct reduced the incentives of competitors and potential competitors to
undertake research and development because "they know that Microsoft will be
able to limit the rewards from any resulting innovation." Complaint
37,
United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. 1998), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f1700/1763.htm.
168 Richard Scheelings & Joshua D. Wright, 'Sui Generis'?: An Antitrust
Analysis of Buyer Power in the United States and European Union, 39 AKRON L.
REV. 207, 213-14 (2006) (stating that the double-marginalization problem
occurs when two monopolists own complementary inputs, and each price at the
monopoly level; the resulting systems price is inefficiently high).
169 Langlois, supra note 22, at 26-27.
170 Bronwyn H. Hall & Marie Ham, Patent ParadoxRevisited: Determinants
of Patenting in the US Semiconductor Industry, 1980-94, at 4, 13-14 Univ. of
Cal., Berkeley, Competition Policy Ctr. Working Paper No. CPC99-05, 1999),
available at
http://repositories.cdlib.orgcgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1021&
context=iber/cpc.
171

See id. at 7.
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Block to Cumulative Innovation

It has been noted that, traditionally, "the innovation process
proceeds in . . .linear and [sequential stages], from research to
development, design, production, and then finally to marketing,
sales, and service." 172 This is illustrated in Figure 4 below. In
this serial model of innovation, little incremental innovation
follows the initial breakthrough. There is no feedback or overlap
between and among stages. 173 In the copyright context, the
owner of copyright on a book may be able to control whether it
should be adapted

Research

f

Development

"

odtDesign/

-.. Marketing I--. Sales and

Service

Production

Fig. 4: A traditional value chain, where innovation is linear.

into a movie. However, once the movie is made, it may not
control how its soundtrack or visual effects should be produced,
or control its merchandising.
However, this model does not address the innovation processes
at the heart of technological change in software digital markets
and some database markets as well. 74 In these markets, the
innovation process is radical and involves significant vertical and
horizontal interdependencies, with tight linkages and feedback
among and between the various stages. 175 Ideas flow freely
within firms in the same industry, simultaneously creating

172 ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS

David J. Teece eds., 1992) (citing JEAN
ORGANIZATION 389 (MIT Press 1988)).

48 (Thomas M. Jorde &

TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL

173 This is unlike the model of simultaneous innovation discussed below. See
infra Part II.C.2.
174 For a detailed and insightful discussion of how costs affect market
structure in "traditional" and R&D intensive industries, see JOHN SUTTON, SUNK
COSTS AND MARKET STRUCTURE: PRICE COMPETITION, ADVERTISING, AND THE
EVOLUTION OF CONCENTRATION (MIT Press 1991).

175 See ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 172, at 49.
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ripples of innovation in firms of associated industries. 17 6 This
promotes cumulative innovation capacity. 177 Innovation takes
place simultaneously at each level, as seen in Figure 5 below.
For example, software products increasingly combine elements
from previous solutions.1 7
Where copyright is granted to
interdependent functional interfaces, their owners will not
merely be able to exert control on their independent production
179
process, as was the case with the linear model of innovation.
Security and Payment
Infrastructure

technologies

CEnabling

Core industry
te
activities

and services

Logistics
L,

Intrfacing

Standards
Organizations

Cnetn

Authoring
and Content
Management

r

Nt
Technologies

En use

Technologies

T

Financial

Legal
Regulatory

Aggregating

HostingCail

Business and
Transaction
Sysm

Hosting
Technologies

Environmental enablers

Fig. 5: A Network-Based
Value Chain showing
simultaneous innovation.
RAHNASTO, supra note 119.

Instead, it will have control over the development of
complements and substitutes that require access to interface
with the standard. Further, with this model of simultaneous
innovation, the quickest copyright owner will control the

176 See J. H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed
Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual
Property Environment, 66 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 315, 345, 353 (2003).
177 See id.

Id.
179 See J.-G. Castel & C.M. Gastle, Deep Economic Integration Between
178

Canada and the United States, the Emergence of Strategic Innovation Policy
and the Need for Trade Law Reform, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 32 (1998).
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technological development dependent on its standard, even if its
80
own initial contribution to the utilitarian balance was minimal.
It thus extracts the maximum value from pre-existing research
while contributing little to future progress.
The substitutability of aesthetic works creates much less
competition concerns than functional works. The latter limit
substitutes to foster the competitive advantage under copyright
18
law, and may therefore justify a competition-friendly regime. '
Further, these rights are given not merely to the authors but also
to those involved "in the production and the diffusion" of the
work.182 Copyright over functional works can therefore seriously
impede innovation if it prevents the diffusion of knowledge and
market entry by those seeking to provide derivative products or
superior substitutes.
Innovation has become more complex, and depends on
technological inputs from more actors. It is debatable whether
society benefits most if it rewards initial innovation through
broad copyright protection, or if it fosters successive innovation
by requiring access to the copyright of the initial innovator.
Copyright has grown into a thicket that leads to a protectionist
barrier in favour of dominant enterprises. This threatens to
balkanize the flow of knowledge in an age where industries move
towards standardization. Standardization produces a range of
compatible products.183 However, where standardized technology
perpetuates on the market, it attracts doubts that the standard
may be suboptimal and access should be granted to allow
competition for a new standard to emerge. 84 As Gustavo Ghidini
argues:
[I]ntellectual protection over the standardized technology vests the
IP-owner with an extremely far-reaching power: namely, the power
to control the degree of competition (in the relevant market, as well
as downstream related ones) throughout the level of
180 See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698
(1998), available at http://www.sciencemag.orgcgilcontent/full/280/5364698.

181

See

GUSTAVO GHIDINI, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW

61-

62 (Edward Elgar 2006).
182

Id. at 58.

Gary R. Ignatin, Comment, Let the Hackers Hack: Allowing the Reverse
Engineering of Copyrighted Computer Programs to Achieve Compatibility, 140
U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2024-25 (1992).
184 See GHIDINI, supra note 181, at 104 (arguing that economic analysis has
identified the risk of adverse impacts of standardization on competition and
consumer welfare as well as the dynamics of innovation).
183
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85
interoperabilityshe is willing-if willing-to grant.

In essence, the copyright owner today not only has a state
sanctioned right over the competitive process, but also the rate of
innovation.186 After all, the corollary of the copyright owner
receiving greater control over its content is the ability to restrict
the access of third parties to it.187 Compelling arguments have
been made that any imbalance should be corrected by
endogenous changes rather than shifting the balance through an
application of competition law. 8 8 As Michael Katz puts it:
Even if one concludes that someone should engage in fine-tuning
intellectual property rights to reflect competitive conditions or
other market characteristics, that someone need not be a
competition policy authority.
Present antitrust laws and
enforcement institutions have not been created with this role in
mind.
Moreover, coordination with the [U.S.] Patent and
Trademark Office [("PTO")] is essential to implementation of a
sound overall policy. Absent legislation, using antitrust policy to
fine tune intellectual property laws would very likely create more
89
problems than it would solve.1

The presumption is therefore against exogenous remedies.

90

at 105.
See id. at 105 (concluding that IPRs, which are granted by government
law, allow an owner of an IPR to set the pace of innovation).
187 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989); see also COPYFIGHTS: THE
185 Id.
186

FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE

(Adam Thierer &

Wayne Crews eds., 2002).
188 See, e.g., Burton Ong, Comment, Anti Competitive Refusals to Grant
Copyright Licences: Reflections on the IMS Saga, 26 E.I.P.R. 505, 507-08 (2004).
189 Michael L. Katz, Intellectual PropertyRights and Antitrust Policy: Four
Principlesfor a Complex World, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 325, 351

(2002). Richard Posner argued:
It is not a violation of [antitrust] laws to acquire a monopoly by lawful
means, and those means include innovations protected from competition by
the intellectual-property laws. If copyright protection of computer software
is too broad (either because too much intellectual-property protection can
reduce output or because ...

too much innovation can be inefficient), that

is a matter to take up with Congress.
POSNER, supra note 123, at 250; see also Ong, supra note 188, at 508 (arguing
that copyright law can remedy anti-competitive refusal to license through "[(1)]
tinkering with the rules on the eligibility of the subject-matter for copyright
protection, [(2)] the nature and scope of the copyright owner's exclusive rights,
and [(3)] the availability of compulsory licences to would-be competitors of the
copyright owner.").
190 See Francesco Parisi, Freedom of Contract and the Laws of Entropy, 10
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 65, 85 (2003) (describing how purely exogenous remedies

would be predetermined by the outside legal system).
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After all, it may be argued that hundreds of years have been
spent developing a sophisticated endogenous machinery to
ensure a "proper" balance between the owner and the public. 191
As the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD") broadly declared, "[t]hough there can be cases where
abuse of dominance laws should be applied to IPR and companies
forced to license their technology or reduce their royalty charges,
such actions bear a high potential cost in terms of reducing
192
incentives to innovate and should be used sparingly."
However, the truth may be that an interface between copyright
and competition law may be inevitable.
Copyright cannot
anticipate and respond to every possible situation where a
copyright owner exploits his right in an anti-competitive manner.
Indeed, TRIPS itself explicitly provides for the use of competition
policy as a device for controlling anti-competitive abuse of
IPRs. 193 With any presumption of legality based on a unilateral
refusal to license, copyright extends as far as the rights
themselves do. 94 Clearly then, copyright that extends beyond
the creative works to create economic bottlenecks, must be
191 Lee Bollinger, Protect This Work of Expression: Clarifying the Unique
Economics of Intellectual Property Rights, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1287, 130304 n.75 (2004) (book review) ("Intellectual property law is replete with examples
of how to balance the rights of the inventor/owner with the interests of the
public: Copyright law protects only works of expression, excluding facts and
ideas, see 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2004); the fair use doctrine, often referred to as a
"safety valve," protects against cases in which the routine application of
copyright law would unduly restrict public access to the work, see id. § 107; and
the Copyright Act contains compulsory licensing provisions, see id. §§ 107-118.
Trademark law provides no protection for generic marks or, with some
qualification, descriptive marks. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2004) (stating that
registered marks that become generic terms are subject to cancellation at any
time); id. § 1052(e), (f) (stating that descriptive marks may only be registered
provided they have acquired secondary meaning). Patent law provides no
protection for fundamental principles or for laws of nature. See, e.g., Diamond
v. Chakrabary, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)."). But see DAVID I. BAINBRIDGE,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 13-14 (5th ed. 2002) (discussing potential ways in
which owners can abuse their holding of IPRs).
192 COMMITTEE ON COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY, ORGANISATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), COMPETITION POLICY AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 9 (1998).
193 Frederick M. Abbott, Public Policy and Global Technological Integration:

An Introduction, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 345, 352 (1996) (citing TRIPS Agreement
art. 40(1)-(2)).
Article 40(2) allows Member states to legislate against
"conditions that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of intellectual
property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant market."
TRIPS, supra note 57, art. 40(2).
194 See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, et. al., Unilateral Refusals to License,
2 J. OF COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1 (2006).
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outside the protection of that presumption. In United States v.
Microsoft, Microsoft argued that because Windows was
copyrighted, it could not violate antitrust laws by refusing to let
people alter the program. 195 The District Court rejected this
argument finding "whatever copyright protection Microsoft
enjoys in its software is not unlimited. For example, copyright in
a computer program does not extend to its functional aspects. It
does not preclude design choices dictated by necessity, costs,
convenience or consumer demand. ' 196 The court continued to
explain that Microsoft's copyright protection "does not render
inviolate portions of the program that are not original to its
creator." 197 This is because "[c]opyright holders are restricted in
They
their ability to extend their control to other markets ....
may not prevent the development and use of interoperable
198
programs by competitors."
It is difficult to imagine a regime that will produce watertight
systems of law. Copyright is not an end in itself. It is but a
microcosm in an ecosystem of rights and interests steered
Properly conceived,
towards innovation and competition.
copyright resounds in harmony with competition law to maintain
199
and enhance efficient market conditions.
It has therefore been argued that competition law should "be

195 U.S. v. Microsoft, No. CIV.A. 98-1232, 1998 WL 614485, at *14 (D.D.C.
Sept. 14, 1998).
196 Id. at *15 (relying on the rationale that "user interface of computer
program[s] [should be] entitled to only limited protection against 'virtually
identical' copying, because of [the] license and because of [the] limited number
of different ways the underlying idea can be expressed" (citing Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Microsoft, 35 F.3d 1435, 1442-43 (9th Cir. 1994) and that "significant
portions of structure, sequence and organization of program may be copied in
order to write similar program to run on different platform[s]" (citing Computer
Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 715 (2d Cir. 1992)).
197 Id.
198 Id. (citations omitted).
199 GHIDINI, supra note 181, at 67 (noting that "[T]he expansionist tendency
of copyright into technological domains, far from representing a well-balanced
response to the need to foster dynamic processes of innovation, blatantly serves
powerful corporate interests aimed at preserving their market dominance for as
long as possible by trying to exclude current and potential competitors. This
results in unbalanced protection that sacrifices the dynamics of competitive
innovation . . . this might lead to an overall reduction in innovative output, as
an ever smaller group of 'unchallenged' firms consolidate almost total control of
the innovation market."); see also MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY:
GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 55-57 (1998)
(addressing the visual art field where "publishers and corporations [are] being
given the greater priority").
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there to regulate abuses of dominant position by [copyright
owners], which copyright law can generate and does not already
address." 20 0 Copyright "protects] inventors against free riding by
granting them a micro-monopoly . . . on the [industrial sector]
they developed, not a macro-monopoly on the industrial sector to
Where the growth impedes
which the solution belongs."2 1
law acts as an integral
competition
efficiency,
economic
counterbalance in a system of innovation. The application of the
EFD to copyright aims to achieve access from the outside, that
cannot be achieved from within. Hanns Ullrich noted, "[b]ecause
legislators often fail to properly define the limits of exclusive
property rights, the exercise of these rights in new situations,
and especially with regard to new technologies, attracts scrutiny
under competition law, with a view to preventing anticompetitive
market foreclosure."20 2
It may be argued that copyright in functional works simply
proves its malleability in securing investments in innovation of a
different kind than aesthetic work as it adapts and reinforces its
However, it is not soft
ability to promote innovation.
a
defence
of the classical position.
sentimentalism that requires
It is the need to preserve the raison d'etre of copyright in
promoting both primary creative works and their derivations
that raises the issues in this paper. Copyright may reinforce
barriers to entry caused by network effects resulting in
consumers being locked into an allegedly inferior standard. The
developments have threatened to upset effective market
competition by creating informational bottlenecks that seem to
cry out for a remedy. This the EFD has provided. 20 3 But could
the remedy be worse than the malady?

III. LAW AND ECONOMICS AT THE INTERFACE
Having established that the expansion of copyright into
functional work can give rise to competitive harm, the analysis
turns to how courts and CEOs have attempted to balance the
need to prevent harm to consumer welfare against the costs of
The three broad
false convictions that chill innovation.
200 Derclaye, AN ECONOMIC APPROACH, supra note
201 GHIDINI, supra note 181, at 109.
Ullrich, Expansionist Intellectual
202 Hanns

98, at 6.

Property Protection and
Reductionist Competition Rules: A TRIPS Perspective, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 401,
403 (2004).
203 See discussion supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
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Next, two
approaches taken by courts will be examined.
assumptions
the
observations will be made regarding
underpinning intervention: whether the EFD should be an
arbiter of unmeritorious copyright, and whether the "new
product" criteria has been sufficiently well defined as to be
workable. Then, two exhortations are made with respect to
intervention in network industries. First, that "superdominance"
should never be an excuse for sloppy competition analysis.
Second, that clear instances of consumer harm should be
required before the EFD unravels tipped markets. Finally, the
section concludes by examining the role of law and economics in
providing a useful resolution to the elusive standard of
"reasonableness" in compulsory licensing.
A. One Doctrine, Three Approaches
Cases have adopted three distinct approaches to regulate
access to functional works. The first approach begins with the
assumption that copyright bottlenecks are best dealt with by
focusing on what is protectable under copyright laws than on
what protectable elements are candidates for compulsory
licensing under the EFD. The second approach denies access
based on owner-centred dynamic efficiency considerations. The
third approach grants access based on competitor-centered
dynamic efficiency considerations.
Approach #1: No Protection

1.

The first category of cases does not recognize copyright
subsisting in the disputed content at all. Thus, in its simplest
form, the US courts in Feist and Lotus held that banal works do
20 4
not qualify for copyright protection in databases and software.
The European Council has taken a markedly different approach,
preferring instead to offer legislative sanctuary in the form of the
Software and Database Directives. 20 5 Because the European
legislators had expressly recognized IPRs in these forms, the
courts in the recent British Horseracing Board cases chose
instead to construe the provisions very strictly, and then apply
the EFD without dynamic efficiency considerations.
See discussion supra Part II.A.
Thomas Hoeren, The European Union Commission and Recent Trends in
European Information Law, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 10-11, 1415 (2003).
204
205
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The British Horseracing Board (BHB) governs horseracing in
Britain. 206 It is responsible for compiling a database that
contains racing information. 2 7 In the British HorseracingBoard
Limited v. William Hill OrganisationLimited ("WHO") case, the
ECJ ruled that the BHB had no valid database right in its
collection of pre-race data since it did not make a sufficient
substantial investment in creating the database over and above
that invested in the creation of its constituent parts. 20 8 The ECJ
made it clear that BHB was investing in the creation of the
database, rather than in the obtaining, selecting and verification
of its constituent parts, activities that gave rise to the sui generis
20 9
database right.
Following its defeat in WHO, BHB then demanded that
entities such as Attheraces ("ATR") who obtained data via BHB
enter into an additional licence with BHB to pay for database
rights in the data. 210 ATR asked the BHB to clarify the basis on
which it sought payment. 2 11 In response, BHB threatened to
terminate the supply of data unless ATR agreed to pay licence
fees to the BHB. 212 In the UK case of AttheRaces & Anor v. The
British HorseracingBoard Ltd & Anor, ATR alleged that BHB
had effective monopoly on the supply of pre-race data on runners
and riders that was necessary to enable bookmakers to take bets
on horse races. 213 BHB abused its market dominance by refusing
to supply ATR with pre-race data and threatened to terminate
the supply of data to ATR even though ATR was an existing
customer of BHB and pre-race data is an essential facility
controlled by BHB. 2 14 The Court found that BHB had abused its
dominant position in relation to pre-race data. 215 However, since
the ECJ had earlier found that there were no database rights in
the pre-race data, this is not authority for the Interface, but
rather how courts can skirt around copyright considerations in
Interface cases. This approach has the merit of focusing on the
206 British Horseracing Bd. Ltd. v. William Hill Org. Ltd., [2005] EWCA (Civ)
863, 4 (Eng.).
207 Id.
9-10.
208 Id. at
24, 31, 35.
209 Id. at
210 Attheraces Ltd. v. British Horseracing Bd. Ltd., [2006] E.C.D.R. 13, 14142 (Eng.).
211 Id. at 146-47, 150.
212 Id. at 150.
213 Id. at 138.
214 Id. at 180-81.
215 Id. at 179-81.
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types of products that justify copyright protection and the
appropriate scope of that protection. However, in a utilitarian
work such as software and databases, it may be difficult to
ascertain the boundaries between creative expression that may
be protected under copyright law and other, functional elements.
2.

Approach #2: No Access

In the second category of cases, the EFD is expressly
considered in the copyright context. However, no access was
given. The jurisprudence here suggests greater belief in net
gains from allowing the owner the prerogative to control access.
The ECJ in IMS Health GmbH & Co KG v. NDC Health (IMS
Health) therefore refused a competitor seeking access only to
offer mere duplicate products. 216 The U.S. Supreme Court in
Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP.
(Trinko), making obiter comments on IPRs in a case involving
access to telecommunications facilities, went one step further
suggesting that where a sector-specific regime is in place, the
EFD had only a severely limited role to play. 217
a. IMS Health
In IMS Health, the copyright covered a modular structure used
for data classification by wholesalers of pharmaceuticals, that
had become the market standard. 218 Pharmaceutical companies
used this data to measure the effectiveness of their promotional
efforts in each town and district.2 19 In order to supply usable
marketing data to customers, the data had to describe sales in
geographic zones as their customers delineated them. 220 There
were no successful substitutes or alternatives to reporting sales
along the same geographic lines as the map of postcodes that
were arranged by IMS Health, which IMS Health was
221
successfully claiming, constituted a breach of its copyright.

216

IMS Health GmbH & Co. v. NDC Health, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 28, at *1543,

*1550, *1567 [hereinafter IMS Health Opinion].
217 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP., 540 U.S.
398 (2004) [hereinafter Trinko]; see also Covad Commc'n Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp.,
398 F.3d 666, 677-78 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (denying a private action for treble
damages in antitrust for failure to perform regulated activities).
218 IMS Health Opinion, [20041 4 C.M.L.R. 28 at *1549-50.
219 Id. at *1549.
220 Id.
221 Id. at *1549-50.
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NDC, who sought market entry based on access to IMS's
structure, argued that its copyright was an essential facility
because pharmaceutical companies did not want to use any map
except the brick structure, even though competitors were free to
develop and offer their own structure or maps. 222 The market
relationship is shown in Figure 6. The Commission therefore
claimed that compulsory licensing was necessary to enable the
competitor to present the same data in the same format. 223 In
doing so, the Commission implicitly suggested that strong
customer
IMS

Fig. 6: The horizontal market
relationship in IMS Health
between competitors.

preferences can make a competitive advantage into an essential
224 It
facility which the dominant owner must share with rivals.
follows that a monopoly can be made the subject of compulsory
licensing even if no other abuse has occurred, to share its
principal competitive advantage with its competitors--dominance
225
without abuse is illegal per se.
The ECJ recognized that while network effects were relevant
in determining whether the data was "essential," the element of
"abuse" could only be established when that behavior impedes
the development of derivative markets. 226 In order for abuse to
222 IMS Health Opinion, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 28 at *1550; IMS Health GambH
& Co. v. NDC Health GmbH & Co., Case C-418/01, at para. 7-8, 11, available at
http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en [hereinafter IMS Health
Judgment].
223 See IMS Health Judgment at para. 12.
224 Id.
225 Id.; IMS Health Opinion, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R 28 at *1550 para. 13-20.
226 IMS Health Judgment. at para. 38, 49.
In truth, the judgment was
equivocal. While the ECJ held that a new product was required in a secondary
market, it set a floor-high threshold in also holding that two separate markets
can be found at "two different stages of production." Id. at para. 45.
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exist, it is necessary that the requestor do more than merely
duplicate the product offered on the secondary market by the
copyright owner. The requestor has to present tangible evidence
showing that it intended "to produce new goods or services not
offered by the owner ... for which there is a potential consumer
demand."2 27 The requestor did not wish to change or improve or
create new reports on regional sales, but only to provide similar
or identical services to IMS Health. 2 8 This meant that the
copyright owner had to provide information on its own market.
Since it could not show potential demand from consumers for a
229
new hypothetical product, access was not granted.
b.

Trinko

Trinko230 was described as "the most important Supreme Court
antitrust review of the refusal to deal antitrust doctrine in
twenty years."231 In Trinko, Verizon was compelled by the
Federal
Communications
Commission
under
the
US
Telecommunications Act of 1996232 to share its local networks
with entrants.2 33 The Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP., a
firm that bought services from one of the entrants, alleged that
Verizon had violated US antitrust law by filling rivals' orders in
a discriminatory manner to discourage customers from joining
the entrants. 234 On appeal, the Supreme Court placed strict
limitations to the situations where antitrust law could interfere
with market sector-specific regulation, suggesting that the
existence of sector-specific regulation should leave little scope for
antitrust intervention and the EFD. 235 The Court's enthusiasm
short-circuits the debate that has raged for decades in the
economic literature about the market structure that best
Id. at para. 49.
Id. at para. 7-8.
IMS Health Opinion, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R 28 at para, 90.
Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 401-02 (2004).
Adam Candeub, Trinko and Re-grounding the Refusal to Deal Doctrine, 66
U. PITT. L. REV. 821, 821 (2004).
232 U.S. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(1996) (codified as amended in sections of 47 U.S.C.).
233 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 401-02.
234 Id. at 404.
235 Id. at 412 ("One factor of particular importance is the existence of a
regulatory structure designed to deter and remedy anticompetitive harm.
Where such a structure exists, the additional benefit to competition provided by
antitrust enforcement will tend to be small, and it will be less plausible that the
antitrust laws contemplate such additional scrutiny.").
227
228
229
230
231
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promotes innovation. 236 While not stating it in so many words,
Trinko may have effectively brought the era of essential facility
claims in the US to an end, certainly in regulated industries
where an agency is actively supervising the conduct that forms
the basis of an antitrust claim, and possibly to copyright as
well.

3.

23 7

Approach #3: Give Access

The final approach directly confronts the core issues at the
Interface. The facts make a compelling case for the court to
grant access to copyright content under the EFD. This raises the
challenging question of determining the scope of access and the
compensation due to the owner. The EU cases of Magill and
Microsoft (EU)both fall into this category. 238 However, as will be
seen, the justifications for access in one case may be less
defensible than the other.

236 KENNETH

J.

ARROW,

Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for

Innovation, in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 144, 156-60 (1971)

(explaining that monopolists may have less incentive to innovate because they
have more to lose than competitors). See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER,
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, & DEMOCRACY 81-106 (3d ed. 1950) (discussing that
monopolists are encouraged to innovate because of scale economies in research
and development and increased appropriation of the full value of their ideas);
See also F. M. Scherer, Antitrust, Efficiency, and Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV.
998, 1011 (1987) ("Although there are fairly simple and well-accepted
generalizations as to which market structures stimulate the most rapid pace of
innovation, the question of what progress rate is socially optimal, and. . . which
market structure driving it is best, is extremely complex and poorly settled.").
237 See GHIDINI, supra note 181, at 107 (observing that "Europe strikes a clear
difference with the other side of the Atlantic. In the U.S., as hinted, the
dominant opinion, quite in tune with the recent ruling of the Supreme Court in
Trinko is traditionally reluctant to allow any breaches in the excluding faculties
of IPRs, viewed as a) indispensable incentives to innovation, and b) already
subject to (sufficient) 'built-in' limitations of time and scope." (citations
omitted)); see also Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-7/97, 1998 E.C.R. 1-07791, para.
38-39, 41, 44-46 (warning against the overzealous application of the EFD to
IPRs). The EFD was justified only when there was a genuine stranglehold on
the related market. This may be where the cost of duplication is prohibitively
high, particularly where the original investment had been made through public
funding. While Bronner was not a case involving copyright, it was important
both because the EFD was discussed at length in the context of IPRs, as well as
that compulsory licensing was regarded as a sub-set of the EFD.
238 Magill, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743, 4 C.M.L.R. 718 (1995); Microsoft Corp. v.
Comm'n of the European Cmtys., Case T-201/04, 2004 E.C.R. 11-2977, paras.
296, 252-53, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en.
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B. Two Observations
The brief survey of cases from Feist to Trinko and Magill to
Microsoft (EU), give rise to several important observations
regarding the balance that is to be made at the Interface. This
section examines two of the most fundamental issues. The first
issue is whether courts and CEOs should use the EFD as a
counterbalance against unmeritorious copyright expansion. The
second issue is how the "new product" criteria first espoused in
Magill should be developed to protect the copyright owner's right
to appropriate rewards in the technology. 239
1. Should the Essential Facilities Doctrine be the Arbiter of
Unmeritorious Copyright?
It may be argued that in cases where access was granted, such
as in Magill, the ECJ was skeptical about the existence of the
copyright in the case and believed it to be unworthy of protection.
In this case, dynamic efficiency considerations were weak. Few
Member States in the European Community granted copyright to
data, and the copyrighted television listings themselves had little
literary merit. 240 Copyright was unnecessary to induce the
stations to produce the listings because they needed viewers to be
aware of the programmes they offered. Therefore, the incentive
to produce and disseminate programs would be the same
irrespective of whether the broadcasters were protected from
competition in the television guide market. 241 Compulsory
licensing therefore would not significantly impact on the
production and release of program listings. Using compulsory
licensing under the EFD to remedy unmeritorious copyright
might well enable courts and CEOs to weaken the copyright
owner's grip over material that it should not be his exclusive
right to exploit. However, there are two problems with this
reasoning.

See Magill, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743, 4 C.M.L.R. 718 (1995).
John Temple Lang, The Application of the Essential Facility Doctrine to
Intellectual Property Rights under European Competition Law, in ANTITRUST,
PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT: EU AND US PERSPECTIVES 57 (Franqois L~v~que &
Howard Shelanski eds., 2005).
241 See James Turney, Defining the Limits of the EU Essential Facilities
Doctrine on Intellectual Property Rights: The Primacy of Securing Optimal
Innovation, 3 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 179, 194 (2005) ("Indeed, officials of
the Commission's legal service stated, in their personal capacities, that Magill
should be limited to 'unmeritorious kinds of intellectual property.'").
239
240
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First, the EFD does not distinguish between types of copyright
based on its value. It has no legal basis to do so; it is not
supported by any holding in Magill.242 Correcting defects in the
political process is not competition law's role.
Rather,
competition law takes legislation as it finds it, even if the
legislation serves the public interest poorly. 243 The scope of
copyright may have an impact on the number and kind of
conflicts that arise, but competition law is concerned with
economic and not political competition. 244 By taking into account
merit in copyright, competition intervention invariably translates
into uncertainty in copyright exploitation, as copyright owners
will not know in advance whether their rights will be whittled
down or upheld by competition authorities. They will also not be
able to estimate correctly the return on their investments. It is
submitted that this consideration led the Trinko court to
fervently defend monopoly power, positioning it as "an important
element of the free-market system" and the magnet for "risk
245
taking that produces innovation and economic growth."
Second, distinguishing unmeritorious copyright is difficult at
best. If the courts or CEOs discriminated among different classes
of copyright, or even within a single class, deeming that access to
some works may be ordered, while others are beyond its scope of
application, this would throw into serious question the integrity
of competition law analysis. If the courts were seeking to
discredit copyright granted under a legislative instrument even
indirectly, the final ruling should be that the copyright matter
falls in the public domain, rather than a finding that the parties
must negotiate terms of access, or failing that, the terms would
be imposed by the courts or CEOs. Put another way, it would be

242 Compare Magill, at para. 7, 10-11, with IMS Health Judgment, Case C418/01, para. 4, 6-7. The differences include the fact that in Magil the
information was owned by the TV companies; however, in IMS Health
Judgment, the sales data was freely available from wholesalers. In Magill,
nobody could produce a substitute for the program list, while in IMS Health
Judgment the plaintiffs had produced their own brick structures. Additionally,
in Magill, the copyright owners discriminated against Magill as they had given
the information to newspapers and foreign magazines. Lastly, in IMS Health
Judgment, it never licensed brick structure anywhere except where it sold a
business, but licensing Magill did not affect the core of the TV companies'
activities.
243 See generally Magill, at para. 26; IMS Health Judgment, at para. 1;
Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 405-06 (2004).
244 See Turney, supra note 241, at 182.
245 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.
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incongruous for CEOs and courts to question the validity of
copyright on the one hand, and on the other, claim that the
owner is entitled to a royalty for the exploitation of the
underlying work.
A better perspective to achieving the same end would be to
regard the EFD simply as a means to compel access to copyright
that has been found to impede the efficient functioning of
copyright. Viewed in this light, access in Magill may then be
understood as follows: "What Magill magazine needed was the
information. If it had been possible to provide the information
without infringing the copyright in the program schedules, no
copyright license would have been needed." 246 Even if copyright
law did not protect the type of low level information which Magill
magazine wanted to publish, the television companies were the
only source of it. If they chose not to distribute the information
at all it was not obtainable elsewhere.2 47 This information was
raw material from which television guides were made. 248 The
television companies therefore held a dominant position both in
the information itself and in the guides made from it
independently of any copyright they might own. 249 It was thus
aptly noted that "copyright was merely the tool used to effect the
250
abuse."
2.

Defining the "New Product"

The cases such as Magill require that the copyright owner
"impede the appearance of a new product desired by
consumers." 251 This requirement attempts to address the concern
that EFD cannot be used to require compulsory licensing merely
because the existence of the copyright creates market power.
This makes good sense. Depriving the owner the right to exploit
on the primary market interferes with the existence of the right.
The difficulty with the new product requirement is that it is a
continuous rather than discrete variable. 252
Products are
246 Lang, supra note 240, at 57 (arguing that the copyright issue had been
raised only as a defense to access by the television companies).
247

Id.

Magill, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. 718, 791.
Id. at 797.
Philips Elec. N.V.v. Ingman Ltd., [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. 839, 861.
Donna M. Gitter, Strong Medicine for Competition Ills: The Judgement of
the European Court of Justice in the IMS HealthAction and Its Implications for
Microsoft Corporation,15 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 153, 189 (2004).
252 See Derek Ridyard, Compulsory Access under EC Competition Law-A
248
249
250
251
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composed of a specific bundle of characteristics.2 53 A product may
be new because additional features alter the manner of
functioning, or improvements in interoperability, medium,
formatting, appearance or product safety. 254 Improvements may
take the form of a more efficient manufacturing process instead
of being physical, which then makes the product cheaper. 255 A
new product may therefore be either a product integrating a new
characteristic 25 6 or a product with better performance on
particular characteristics. 25 7 However, this does not help to
establish whether the refusal prevents development of the
258
secondary market to consumer detriment.
It is submitted that there should be two refinements to the
"new product" requirement.
First, the product should be a
derivation not previously offered, and not merely a clone. The
latter would set too low a threshold since every product would
potentially attract compulsory licensing. The implications of the
potential markets concept are far reaching. For example, new
functions can always be added to software. The law could hardly
impose a duty to share important internally generated
competitive advantages with direct competitors on demand,
merely on the basis of their intention to offer a product with some
new characteristics.
As William Cornish observed:
It can certainly be argued that this fencing off of intangible
subject-matter fulfils an economic function equivalent to that of
ownership of physical property, because otherwise the incentive to
optimise the value of the information will be impaired or destroyed.
Those who would be innovators will wait instead to be imitators
and the dynamic processes which would have generated new ideas
will disappear; in the end there will be little or nothing different to
New Doctrine of "ConvenientFacilities"and the Case for Price Regulation, 2004
E.C.L.R. 669 (2004) (arguing that the "new product" may lead to newcomers
being given access for even minor changes), http://www.rbbecon.com/
newsimages/Ridyard-ECLR-nov2004.pdf (last visited June 5, 2007).
253 Examples include the maximum speed or the number of seats of in a car.
254 See Ridyard, supra note 252, at 673 (arguing that "[a] requirement to
grant access without specifying the terms of access leaves the problem only
part-resolved" making the definition of a "new product" broad).
255

See id.

An example of a new product integrating a new characteristic is a car
engine powered by both gas and electricity.
257 A higher maximum speed is an example of a better performance on
particular characteristic.
258 See IMS Health Opinion, Case C-418/01, 2004 E.C.R. 1-5039, [2004] 4
C.M.L.R. 28, 1560.
256
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imitate.259

It is simple enough to identify a specific "new product," like the
TV guide in Magill,260 which clearly could not be offered without
261
access to the copyrighted listings owned by the defendants.
However, in Microsoft (EU), both the Commission and CFI
simply held that Microsoft's refusal to disclose its copyrighted
codes would prevent competitors from developing "new products"
without specifying what they were. 262 Indeed, it is difficult to see
what additional value access to Sun Microsystems could have,
since it was in fact producing a functionally identical substitute
to Microsoft's work group server OS. Where a "new product"
cannot be convincingly defined, the plaintiff has not discharged
263
its burden of proof, and no access should be granted.
Second, the EFD should be confined to "new products" in the
secondary market. Copyright justifies an exclusive protection in
the primary market in order to prevent copying. Appropriability
does not take the form of a lump sum payment, but rather as an
opportunity to market their goods without interference by free
riders. In contrast, when downstream markets are also affected,
the contribution through the creation of copyrighted work does
not justify its abusive use for other purposes on a secondary
market.

259 CORNISH, supra note 74,
260 This would be a weekly

at 36.
TV magazine comprising the programs of all TV

channels.
261 Magill, Cases C 241-242/91P, [1995] E.C.R. 1-743, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. 718,
750.
262 See Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n European Cmtys, Case T-201/04, [2004] 4
C.M.L.R. 5. For avoidance of doubt, the Court of First Instance (CFI) did not
hold that Microsoft's refusal to disclose APIs would prevent 'new products' for
the purposes of demonstration of exceptional circumstances under Article 82.
Id. The proceedings before the CFI leading to the President's order of December
22, 2004 were for interim relief. Id. at *430. The only issues were: (1) whether
Microsoft established a prima facie case that the Commission was wrong on the
law and its application to the facts; and (2) whether the harm to Microsoft of
having to implement the Commission's orders immediately gave cause to
overrule them. Id. at *438, *441 (discussing the issue of diminishing consumer
choice as a result of non-interoperability). However, in Microsoft (EU), both the
Commission and CFI simply found that Microsoft's refusal to disclose its
copyrighted codes would prevent competitors from developing "new products"
without specifying what they were. See id. at *463-64.
263 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 194, at 2 (highlighting that after the
antitrust counterrevolution of the 1970s and 1980s "the procedural limitations
placed on plaintiffs became severe").
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C. Two Exhortations
Generally, network markets do not require special rules.
However, they require sensitivity to the fact that networks can
both produce significant efficiencies and increased opportunities
for the exercise of market power. However, two issues are of
special importance to functional copyright industries. The first
issue is whether "superdominant" owners are penalized because
their market power makes abuse a matter of course. The second
issue is whether cases have required access without proof of real
harm to consumer welfare.
1. Penalizing Superdominance
Whether a facility is "essential" is often a question of a degree
of dominance. Dominance is the power to behave independently
of market forces.2 64 As in any investigation into abuse of
dominant position, it is necessary to define the relevant market
The downstream market will inevitably
in an EFD case.
influence the definition of the essential facility in the upstream
Economists play a critical role in measuring
market.
"essentiality" through market power analysis. Once dominance
is established, the copyright owner has a duty to grant access
where a non-dominant does not.2 65 This is because dominance
brings a special responsibility to refrain from acting in a manner
that harms competition. 266 It follows then that "superdominant"
copyright owners have an even heavier responsibility to ensure
an objectively acceptable state of market competitiveness.
The first danger here is that because the competition analysis
involves a value judgment based on the facts of each case, the
decision makers also have substantial discretion in defining that
This discretion creates a danger that the
objectivity.
"essentiality" may be read so broadly as to mean that a plaintiff
is automatically entitled to access the owner's copyright content
whenever dominance is established. As Herbert Hovenkamp
264 See CCS, COMPETITION COMMISSION OF SINGAPORE GUIDELINE ON THE
3.3 (2005), http://www.ccs.gov.sg/NR/rdonlyres/
SECTION 47 PROHIBITION 2005

B872DBBC-0483-488D-9427-281AD287564D/6720/CCSGuidelineonSection47
prohibition20051228websitef.pdf (last visited June 5, 2007).
265 Brian A. Facey & Dany H. Assaf, Monopolization and Abuse of Dominance
in Canada, the United States, and the European Union: A Survey, 70 ANTITRUST
L.J. 513, 560 (2002).
266 Compagnie Maritime Belge v. Comm'n, [2000] E.C.R. 1-1365, 4 C.M.L.R.
1076, 37 (2000).
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observed:
To be sure, the rules that courts develop are related to the values
they believe antitrust should further. If we think copyrights are
packed with anticompetitive potential, then we might respond with
owners are monopolists. Several
a rule that presumes that their
267
decisions have done just that.
Even assuming dominance is properly established, another
danger would be assuming an abuse automatically follows a
refusal to grant access. Compulsory licensing in such cases then
arises from looking forward at the desired conduct rather than
looking backward and ensuring the discontinuation of the alleged
abuse.
The link between the compelled conduct and the
infringing act may be rather imperceptible, although to the eyes
of the general public the compelled conduct may have great
political or industrial symbolism. 268 The EFD then becomes most
attractive to plaintiffs because "essentiality" effectively shifts
269 If
onto defendants the burden of justifying its denial of access.
it can be accepted that this happens, however inadvertently, at
least some of the time, the EFD may then represent a
streamlined technique for proving anticompetitive harm. This
provides savvy plaintiffs with a short-cut to turn the EFD into a
siphon to appropriate the owner's investment and effort under a
267 HOVENKAMP, supra note 194, at 5 (citing United States v. Paramount
Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948); United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962);
MCA Television Ltd. v. Public Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265 (1999)).
268 As Ian Forrester aptly noted: "To put matters rather severely, but not
necessarily unfairly, the analysis sometimes seems to start with the desired
remedy rather than with the theory of the abuse." Forrester, supra note 166, at
922.

269 Allen Kezsbom & Alan V. Goldman, No Shortcut to Antitrust Analysis:
The Twisted Journey of the "EssentialFacilities"Doctrine, 1996 COLUM. Bus. L.

1, 26 (1996).
As with most non-per se claims, the plaintiff bears the burden of
persuasion that the challenged conduct is unreasonable. Of course, the
defendant should bear the usual burden of coming forward with some

REV.

evidence of justification. But once he does so, it should be the plaintiffs
obligation to persuade the judge or jury that the justification should be

rejected. That seems especially appropriate here where the warrant for
requiring owners of goods or facilities to share them with competitors is
somewhat questionable to start with, where the imposition of such a duty
is exceedingly intrusive, and where it is subject to so many reservations
about the ability of courts to compel dealing with reasonable predictability,
with reasonably effective administration, and without chilling desirable
activities.
Id. at 32-33 (quoting PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw:
AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION,

63 (Supp. 1995) (emphasis added)).
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doctrine of "essential" facilities. 270
Traditional market definition analysis should come before
applying the doctrine. Defining a market merely by existing
dominance begs the question of whether the copyright work is
"essential." Once access is granted to interface information, the
competitor, particularly in permeable software markets, are free
to develop competing products against the original work. To
contextualise the issue, the Commission in Microsoft opined that
since access to the source code was not being required,
Microsoft's fears of cloning were not justified. 27 1 It followed that
2 72
Microsoft's "incentives to innovate" would not be affected.
However, Valentine Korah disagrees, saying that: "the incentive
273
must have been considerably reduced."
The second danger with superdominance is that the
assumptions
supporting it
may
not be
appropriate.
Superdominance assumes that market definition was correctly
274
done, and that the superdominance will be semi-permanent.
Technology markets may not be neatly fitted into competition
markets. 275 As Fig. 7 shows, exploitation of copyright may often
transcend more than one relevant market. 276 The scope of a legal
monopoly is defined by the normative boundaries of copyright,
not by what a court determines is the relevant market. 277 In
contrast, the scope of an economic monopoly refers to a firm's
power to control the price of a product in a properly defined
relevant competition market. 278 Since the reward of copyright is
the right to exploit the entire field it covers, they can implicate

Id. at 2-3.
Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, [2005] 4 C.M.L.R. 5, paras. 713, 729.
Id. at para. 725.
KORAH, supra note 35, at 162. And if Microsoft's cutback on R&D is
anything to go by, she is probably right. In 2004, R&D was USD 7,779 million,
declining in 2005 to USD 6,184 million. See MICROSOFT ANNUAL REPORT 2000
and 2005, http://www.microsoft.com/msftlar.mspx (in Income Statements within
Financial Review) (last visited June 5, 2007).
274 John T. Lang & Robert O'Donoghue, Defining Legitimate Competition:
How to Clarify PricingAbuses Under Article 82 EC, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 83,
135 (2002).
275 See STEVEN D. ANDERMAN, EC COMPETITION LAW AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 154 (Clarendon Press, 1998).
276 Id. at 161.
277 Thomas P. Walsh III, Defining the Relevant Market: Impacts of the
Abolition of the Presumption of Market Power in Patent Tying Cases, 84 DENV.
U. L. REV. 267, 268, 282-83 (2006).
270
271
272
273

278

Id.
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multiple competition markets.2 79 Accordingly, there should not
be liability for refusing to license within the market defined by
its legal monopoly, regardless of the number of competition
markets this implicates. By restricting this exploitation, the
legitimate extent of exploitation may be eviscerated.
Third, large market shares can often be deceptive. Often an

the primary and

essential facility is continuously under threat and the right
holder is compelled to constantly keep under review or develop
its primary product. 28 0 Technology markets, in particular, are
dynamic and ways are often found to circumvent what was
In fact,
previously believed to be an industry standard. 28 '
"secondary market rivals may also be potential primary market
rivals."2 8 2 After all, market definition is more of a legal construct
than a reflection of bright-line distinctions on a production
chain. Generally, mere exploitation of an industrial standard
without regard for rivals is not by itself viewed as abusive under
competition law. 28 3 A firm that has achieved a market standard
by virtue of its investment in R&D and IP protection is normally
entitled to continue to compete by exercising its exclusionary

279 See Dom F. Atteritano, The Growing FinancialPie of Online Publication:
Tasini's New-Use Analysis Leaves Freelance Authors Less Than Crumbs, 27
Hofstra L. Rev. 377, 388 (1998).
280 See ANDERMAN, EC Competition Law, supra note 275, at 250.
281 Id.
282 Daryl Lim Tze Wei, Regulating Access to Databases Through Antitrust
Law: A Missing Perspective In the DatabaseDebate, 2006 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 7,
53 (2006).
283 Ronald E. Myrick, Will Intellectual Property on Technology Still Be Viable

In a Unitary Market, 14 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 298, 301 (1992).
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rights even in "aftermarkets. ''28 4 To find that a refusal to licence
is abusive, something more must be shown by the competition
authorities to allow the imputation of an abusive motive to the
copyright owner's conduct other than a refusal to supply or
licence as such. 28 5 It is appropriate to note that while the EFD
requires open access,28 6 nothing guarantees that new
membership into the primary market will automatically pass
benefits of access to consumers.
Indeed, by requiring
communication of proprietary information between competing
undertakings, competition law may well be trading exclusionary
abuse to anticompetitive collusion.28 7 The cost structure within
the technological markets naturally leads to concentrations of
market power. Any attempt by CEOs to artificially fragment the
market will likely damage the efficiency of the industry to the
28 8
ultimate detriment of consumers.
The fourth objection is closely related to the third. Some
functional copyright markets are very permeable.
In the
Microsoft cases, a common justification raised was Microsoft's
concern that its downstream rival might enter the primary OS
28 9
market once its application protocol interfaces were disclosed.
In Microsoft (US), Microsoft expressed concern about the
'middleware' threat posed by Netscape Internet Browsers riding

284 ANDERMAN, EC COMPETITION LAW, supra note 275, at 6. "There may be
reservations about the use of this concept in 'aftermarkets' for spare parts and
consumables, where the degree of competition in upstream markets can limit
the effects of dominance or monopoly in downstream markets." Id. at 250.
285 Myrick, supra note 283, at 301.
286 ANDERMAN, EC COMPETITION LAW, supra note 275, at 202.
287 See Myrick, supra note 283, at 298.
288 Anderman, EC COMPETITION LAW, supra note 275, at 154 (proposing a
useful solution: "[wihen, however, the product is more technically complex, the
selection of the initial product involves the exercise of greater discretion by the
competition authorities. They can decide whether and to what extent to view
the various sub-products or raw materials as components of an integrated
product and to what extent to view each sub-product or raw material as a
product in its own right. In the case of products such as consumables and spare
parts, they can decide whether they are part of the product package presented
by the firm to users and consumers or separate products creating separate
markets. Furthermore, where a firm has integrated two different levels of
economic activity within the same company, the Commission can decide
whether these operations constitute an integrated operation offering 'one
product' or are separate activities offering separate products on separate
markets despite the corporate form of the operations.").
289 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 28 (D.D.C. 1999);
Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n of the European Cmtys., [20051 4 C.M.L.R. 5, 441-42
(2004).
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on Java technology to run applications, which Microsoft's
Windows OS provided a platform for. 290 Similarly, in Microsoft
(EU), Sun Microsystems requested interface information
required for its downstream workgroup server OS to fully
interact with Microsoft's Windows OS.291 This may be seen in
Fig. 8. Microsoft contended that this refusal was premised on its
concern that Sun would then be able to use the interoperability it
had provided to produce perfect substitutes to compete with its
Windows OS.292
In neither case was this threat taken
293
seriously.
The truth is that the threat posed by the Internet remains a
real competitive constraint. As Microsoft recently admitted:
[Blarriers to entry in our businesses generally are low. The
Internet as a distribution channel and non-commercial software
model described above have reduced barriers to entry even further.
Non-commercial software vendors are devoting considerable efforts
to developing software that mimics the features and functionality
of various of our products. In response to competitive factors, we
are developing versions of our products with basic functionality
294
that are sold at lower prices than the standard versions.
An example of this is Google's web-based spreadsheet, one of
several free spreadsheet programs available. 29
It mimics
290 See United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
84 F. Supp. 2d at 28-29.
Middleware is a platform designed to be compatible with several OS and can
support many applications. Id. at 17. This allows middleware compatible
applications to be used on other OS. Arguably, middleware creates the same
risk of market foreclosure if the market tips in its favour over other
middleware. The riposte to this is that there will at least be competition
between the middleware owner and the OS applications owners, as writers of
new applications may make their applications compatible with the middleware.
Id. at 28.

See Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n of the European Cmtys., 4 C.M.L.R. at 422.
Id. at 439-40.
293 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d at 112; Microsoft
Corp. v. Comm'n of the European Cmtys, 4 C.L.M.R. at 454.
294 MICROSOFT
CORP.
ANNUAL
REPORT
16 (2005), available at
291
292

http://www.microsoft.com/msft/reports/ar05/flashversion/10k dl dow.html (last
visited June 6, 2007). See also Forrester Research observed that "Microsoft is
crawling into the future of concise internet services burdened by its bloated,
over-engineered... one-size-fits-all software model." Cliff Saran, The Future of
Microsoft After
Gates, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM,
June
29,
2006,
http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/Article.aspx?liArticleID=216589.
295 John Markoff, Google to Release Web-Based Spreadsheet, N.Y. TIMES, June
5, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/05/technology/ 05cndgoogle.html?ei=5070&en=4803140c3fcacd04&ex=1169528400&adxnnl=
1&adxnnlx=1169436372-KcwKC04hMy71A8ZYx3XD9w#.
Others are iCalc,
iRows, Editgrid and ZohoSheet, with distinctive functions that are not currently
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Microsoft's Excel program, a key component of its Office suite
and an oft-cited "applications barrier to entry."296 While still an
incomplete substitute, the report states that this is part of a
series of strategies to create an alternative to Microsoft's desktop
PC software business. 297 Future potential substitutes provide
competitive constraints on market behavior much in the same
manner as existing ones do and therefore should be an integral
298
part of determining "essentiality."
In examining the distribution of rewards to technological
innovation, F. M. Scherer found that the majority of innovative
Technological
only modest rewards. 299
efforts confer
entrepreneurs may be like lottery players and derive positive
It follows that
utility from the "skewness of rewards. '30 0
copyright owners should not be hobbled simply because they have
made too much money for dynamic efficiency considerations to be
used as a justification for protection. 30 1 A private firm, however
found in Microsoft's Excel. See EditGrid, Online Spreadsheet Comparison,
http://www.editgrid.coinuser/thomas-cLausen/online-Spreadsheet-Comparison?
ro=1 (last visited June 6, 2007).
296 Robert A. Levy, Microsoft: In Search of the Perfect Remedy, Feb. 10, 2000,
http://www.cato.org/dailys/02-10-00.html; see also Markoff, supra note 295.
297 Markoff, supra note 295.
298 Shamnad Basheer, Block Me Not: How "Essential"Are Patented Genes?,
2005 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 55, 76 (2005).
299 Frederic M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in EXPANDING THE
BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

3, 7 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss et al. eds.,

2001).
300 Id. at 16.
301 Id. at 20.
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dominant, should not be treated like a nationalized industry. In
the case of nationalized industries, the investment was either
made by taxpayers or made when the firm was protected from
competition. 30 2 To open up a portion of these industries to
competition seems fair. However, firms like Microsoft invest
many millions of dollars while subject to competition from other
firms. Turning upon them and requiring access when it wins the
innovation race and becomes the market standard seems; plainly
unjust.
"Lock-Ins" and Proof of Consumer Harm

2.

As discussed earlier, interventionists have argued 'lock-ins'
lead to monopoly prices and inferior products.30 3 The concept of
"lock-ins" rests on the belief that the free market competition
does not allow the best quality standard to win. 304

Products

succeed in spite of inferior quality because consumers purchase
such products only because everyone else uses them, while in
fact, each consumer would have preferred to use a different
product. 30 5 As, the European Commission argued in Microsoft
(EU):
Due to the lack of interoperability . . . an increasing number of
consumers are locked into a homogenous Windows solution at the
level of work group server operating systems. This impairs the
ability of consumers to benefit from innovative work group server
operating system features brought to the market by Microsoft's
competitors.
In addition, this limits the prospect for such
competitors to successfully market their innovation and thereby

discourages them from developing new products. . . [and] will be
confined to niche existences or not be viable at all. There will be
little scope for innovation-except possibly for innovation coming
from Microsoft.

30 6

First, it is important to recognise a distinction between the
ability of the copyright owner to exploit the inelasticity of its
Id. at 21.
303 See discussion supra Part II.B. See also Paul A. David, Understanding
the Economics of QWERTY: The Necessity of History, in ECONOMIC HISTORY AND
THE MODERN ECONOMIST (W.N. Parker ed., Basil Blackwell 1986).
304 Animesh Ballabh, Antitrust Law: An Overview, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOc'Y 877,884 (2006).
305 Dwight R. Lee & Richard B. McKenzie, A Case For Letting A Firm Take
Advantage of "Locked-In" Customers, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 795, 796 (2001).
306 Commission Decision, Microsoft, Comp/C-3/37.792 at paras. 694, 700
(2004) (emphasis added) available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/
antitrust/cases/decisions37792/en.pdf.
302
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short-run demand for greater profits and the incentive to do so,
given the much higher elasticity of its long-run demand under
which the network effects can build-and unravel. 3 7 A firm
producing a network product must fear that an increase in the
current price might lead to greater current profits, but also to an
unravelling of the network in the long run, causing the firm to
gain short-run profits at the expense of profits later on. The net
effect of the firm seeking to exploit its current ability to raise its
price could be a reduction in the market value of its stock.
Indeed, there is evidence that network markets remain highly
308
competitive despite domination by a single standard owner.
Second, copyright and network effects may give innovators
some temporary market power and rewards for innovation, but
skilful and aggressive imitators tend to drive prices to costs
unless the innovator can successfully retain a first mover
Stan
advantage for subsequent technological advances. 30 9
Liebowitz and Stephen Margolis drew important correlations
between market shares and product quality, as indicated by
computer magazine reviews. 310 A significant outcome was seen in
the markets for personal finance software and software for
spreadsheets, where products remained dominant because of
their quality. 311 The criticism against "lock-ins" by copyright
307 In common parlance, this means that the owner stands to gain much from
not raising prices, and stands to lose as much from raising them.

308 See Robert Prentice, Vaporware: Imaginary High-Tech Products and Real
Antitrust Liability in a Post-ChicagoWorld, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1163, 1229 (1996);
Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to High Technology
Competition, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 78 (2002) ("There are many examples
of network markets that started out as competitive but ultimately came to be

dominated by one or a few firms. In the video recording market, the VHS
format achieved such an advantage over the Beta format, and in computer
operating systems, Microsoft prevailed over IBM, Apple Computer, and
Novell.").
309 STAN -J.
LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS &
MICROSOFT: COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY 21, 258-59

(Revised ed. 2001).
310 Id. at 166-68, 227 (describing how standardization of measurements was
resolved in each case).
311 Id. at 175. Three software brands competed in the PFS market: Quicken
by Intuit, Microsoft Money, and Managing Your Money (MYM) by Meca. Id. at
201. In the 1980s, MYM was initially considered the best and most powerful
product in the category. Id. When Quicken was introduced, it received less
positive reviews as it was not as powerful as MYM. Id. "Over time Intuit

improved Quicken, adding more sophisticated features." Id. By the early
1990s, it was considered at least the equal of MYM, and by the mid-1990s,
Quicken was clearly considered the best product.

Id. at 202-03. In 1991,

Microsoft introduced'its Money program for Windows. Id. at 204. "Quicken's
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owners however, was that they "should have been able to
leverage [their] ownership of the [copyrighted work] to achieve a
dominant position," independent of its quality. 312 However,
according to their studies, there was a strong positive correlation
between the review ratings given to the product and its market
share. 313 Where the incumbent was replaced, the rival's product
was of a "far higher quality, or [was] cheaper, or [was
314
technologically] more advanced in some other way.
The allegation that consumers are harmed because the
elimination of competition restricts their choice is only true if
consumers prefer product variety to positive network
externalities. For example, market dominance could enhance
market efficiency because the market is actually larger than it
would otherwise be.
More applications will be offered by
software developers who are confident of the standard's
durability.
All applications could be written for a single
standard.
Porting costs would be reduced and the price of
applications could be lower. In-house and external expertise
would only need to be built on one system. The average price
charged to consumers could be lower than it otherwise would be
31 5
due to the increased elasticity from network effects.
Monopolies in network industries could also establish uniform
standards that make it easier for consumers to connect to the

retention of its market leadership [was] not surprising" given its high quality as
indicated in successful reviews. Id. at 205. Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E.
Margolis, Network Effects and the Microsoft Case, in THE ECONOMICS OF
QWERTY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND POLICY 225 (Peter Lewin, ed., N.Y. Univ.
Press 2002).
312 Liebowitz & Margolis, Network Effects and the Microsoft Case, supra note
311, at 227.
313 LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS & MICROSOFT, supra note 309,
at 227.
314 Id.
Microsoft produced a relatively inferior product, and failed to tip that
market. See id. at 206. Indeed, the PFS market share graph shows one
dominant firm followed by another dominant firm, or what is known serial
monopoly. Id. at 204. The "serial monopoly" hypothesis stands for the
proposition that "at any time, it is likely that only one firm is in the market; but
the threat that they could be overtaken at any time by any entrant disciplines
their price, quality and innovation behavior." Gerald R. Faulhaber, Bottlenecks
and Bandwagons: Access Policy in
the New
Telecommunications,
http://assets.wharton.upenn.edu/~-faulhabe/Bottlenecks%20and%2OBandwagons
.pdf. Since market shares changed so rapidly, the concept of lock-in and tipping
seems out of place. Id. at 202.
315 See RICHARD B. MCKENZIE, DIGITAL ECONOMICS: How INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY HAS TRANSFORMED BUSINESS THINKING 284-85 (Praeger 2003).
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network and interact with other users. 316 The competitive
process inevitably results in the elimination of some, perhaps all
competitors.
By being the most innovative, efficient and
responsive to customers' wishes, the copyright owner may well be
the last one standing.
It would be strange and indeed harmful if such efficient market
outcomes were penalized. It is unsound policy to base regulatory
action simply on possibilities, particularly where those
presenting them acknowledge no obligation to subject them to
rigorous empirical tests. The theory of harmful 'lock-ins' simply
317
asserts that under certain assumptions, the possibility exists.
People are often locked in by their prior decisions. 318 Someone
who buys a Volvo would be locked in to Volvo aftermarket parts
for the term of ownership. In some cases, buyers may not have
examined long-term ownership costs carefully and others are
deceived by initial misrepresentations or post-purchase changes
in policies. But to turn these into competition issues transforms
it into -a general economic engine for reform of improvident
decisions. As the Supreme Court in Trinko warned, "[tihe cost of
false positives counsels against an undue expansion of [EFD]
liability. '3 19 The dichotomy between false positives and false
negatives has been vigorously debated in the scholarly literature.
The Chicago School has contended that false convictions (in
which a defendant is wrongfully found guilty of a crime) are more
dangerous than false acquittals (in which a defendant is

316 Stephen. Labaton, Airlines and Antitrust: A New World. Or Not, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 18, 2001, § 3, at 1 ("The old antitrust principles do not apply easily
because there are countervailing benefits to consumers-like lower prices,
standardization or more frequent service-when control of the industry is in the
hands of a few companies."). The benefits of uniform technological standards
are evident in the contrast between wireless phone performance in the US and
most of the rest of the world. Walter S. Mossberg, A Guide to the Lingo You'll
Want to Learn for Wireless Technology, Wall St. J., Mar. 28, 2002, at B1. The
United States never was able to settle on a single standard for wireless phone
technology "and that blunder has resulted in a patchwork of multiple,
incompatible technologies." Id. By contrast, Europe and most other countries
settled on a single standard thus have "better and more innovative wireless
phones and wireless services." Id.
317 See LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS & MICROSOFT, supra note
309, at 138 ("Confirmation of lock-in requires that better products exist that are
not adopted.").
318 See LIEBOWITZ

&

MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS & MICROSOFT, supra note

309, at 51.
319 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398, 414 (2004).
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wrongfully acquitted) because they cannot be remedied by the
32 0
marketplace.
If competition law is to intervene based on anticompetitive
network effects, courts and CEOs ought to find at least one clear
instance of it. There must be evidence of actual or likely future
3 21
consumer harm, which economic studies have yet to show.
However, the study above shows the opposite: in the real world,
good products have won. Confirmation of 'lock-ins' requires
evidence of non-adoption of existing better products. 322 Testing
for inertia requires "compar[ing] the rate of change in actual
market shares with the ideal rates of change," which is
"considerably more detail[ed] than [empirical] data allow[s]. "323
Third, the belief that inferior products will follow lock-ins
wrongly assumes that programmers hired by the incumbent lack
or lose creativity. Dominant owners benefit from new ideas as
much as smaller firms. 324 A lazy board of directors will quickly
see their stocks acquired and the board replaced by infuriated
shareholders. Software and database markets require producers
to continually add new functions to their products. 325 Unlike
McDonald's consumers who want the same Big Macs they ate the
day before, functional works do not vanish or suffer in quality on
consumption. 326 Consumers have little incentive to purchase new
software from the dominant vendor unless new and significant
improvements are offered. 327 Therefore, the policy implication of
this is that courts and CEOs can help ensure that consumers get
the best products by keeping regulatory impediments out of
entrepreneurial competition to establish their mousetraps in the
marketplace.328
320 See Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, PreservingCompetition: Economic
Analysis, Legal Standards and Microsoft, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 30-33 (1999)
(stating that false convictions discourage competition and encourage firms to
seek compensation in the courts and that false acquittals promote competition
over the long run).
321 David S. Evans et al., United States v. Microsoft: Did Consumers Win?, 1
J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 497, 498-99 (2005).
322 LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS & MICROSOFT, supra note 309,
at 138.
323

Id.

324
325

Id. at 256.
Id. at 258.

326

Id.
Id.

327

328 Indeed, David Teece and Mary Coleman maintain that intervention in
high technology industries should be avoided except in the most unusual of
circumstances, because efforts to hobble the winner in one round of innovation
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Fourth, where refusals to license seem anticompetitive at first
blush due to concerns over path dependency, it is possible the
CEOs and courts have been misled. Stan Liebowitz and Stephen
Margolis suggest that there are three possible efficiency
329
outcomes where a dynamic process exhibits path dependency.
First-degree path dependency occurs where the future impact of
330
initial actions are fully appreciated and taken into account.
There is no error or inefficiency in those decisions, despite the
sub-optimality of the situation in a given period, and no remedy
is required. 331 Second-degree path dependency recognizes that
"information is never perfect. '332 Efficient decisions may not "be
efficient in retrospect." 333 However, the inferiority of a choice
cannot be known at the point where the choice was made. 334 In
this situation, outcomes, though somewhat inefficient, are
unavoidable and again should not warrant remedy. 335 Thirddegree path dependency occurs where initial conditions lead to
an inefficient outcome, but it was possible to recognize and avoid
336
the inferior outcome at the point where the decision was made.
will be seen as diminishing the returns available from competing in high-risk
environments, thereby diverting resources to other sectors of the economy
which display less risk and afford less innovation. Teece & Coleman, supra
note 109, at 843-44 (Teece and Coleman argue that intervention "might
The
produce severe disincentive affects throughout the entire economy.
possibility of success through superior skill, foresight, and acumen, or just
dumb luck, induces entry, investment, and unparalleled even maniacal effort.
To penalize success with poorly reasoned antitrust intervention is dangerous.").
329 LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS & MICROSOFT, supra note 309,
at 52-55.
330 Id. at 53.
Liebowitz and Margolis explain first-degree path dependence by an
331 Id.
analogy to a couple buying a house. Upon buying the house, the couple properly
takes into account future prices, incomes, and family size developments. Thus,
the house may be too big at first when the couple moves in as newlyweds, then
just right when the couple has children, then too small with grandchildren, then
too big when the children and grandchildren move out. All this may have been
predicted fairly well. Id.
332 Id.
333 Id.
334 Id. at 53-54.
335 Id. at 54. An example of this would be someone buying a house without
possibly being able to know that five years down the road a sewage treatment
plant will be built nearby, drastically lowering property prices and the
neighbourhood amenities nearby. Here, there is dependence on past conditions,
which lead to regrettable outcomes, and the person may not have bought the
house had he known in advance what was going to happen. But because of
limited knowledge, the path dependence is not inefficient in any meaningful
sense.
336 Id. An example of this would be where someone bought a house, knowing
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First-degree path dependence assumes that the copyright
owner's product and other rivals were essentially the same and
the eventual market choices of the owner were arbitrary and lead
to a significant and durable outcome. 337 Courts and CEOs cannot
use static or dynamic efficiency models to predict which of
several equally efficient possibilities will be chosen and the
outcome is completely random. If the argument is taken a step
further to second-degree path dependence, CEOs may assert that
the owner's products are notably inferior. However, during the
time the owner dominated the standard, it might not have been
known that some other standard would be better in the future.
Ex post, it may appear that the market's choice of the owner's
product was a mistake, although it was not a mistake given the
information when the market tipped.
The argument can go further. CEOs may claim that at the
beginning, sufficient information existed to determine that other
platforms were superior, thus making a case for third-degree
path dependence. This may occur if at the time that the owner
introduced its products, most consumers preferred rival products,
but were unaware that others had similar preferences. In that
case, a slim lead for the 'inferior' standard might have
propagated into eventual market dominance. Refusals to grant
licenses to interface information therefore impede technological
development, and translate into an anticompetitive abuse.
Alternatively, if it were widely understood that switching to the
rival platform would confer greater benefits than the switching
cost of doing so, but that you are forced to remain with the owner,
this would be another instance of third-degree path dependence.
This has yet to occur because each consumer prefers the owner's
platform, given that all other users and developers use it.
However, there is neither convincing theory nor empirical
support for this proposition. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests
that third-degree path dependence, if it exists, is so rare that it
should not be the basis for regulatory intervention.3 38 Although
that "a sewage plant is going to be built, but build [s] the house nearby anyway
since all of [his] friends are buying houses there and [he] value[s] being part of
that neighborhood. [He] would rather buy a house away from the sewage plant,
and so would [his] friends, but [they were] somehow unable to coordinate [their]
actions." Id.
337 See id. at 53, 55.
338 See Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Dismal Science Fictions:
Network Effects, Microsoft, and Antitrust Speculation, in THE ECONOMICS OF
QWERTY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND POLICY 179, 205 n.10 (Peter Lewin ed., 2002)
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markets do not always choose the best technology, there are good
reasons to expect it to be very unusual for consumers to choose
the wrong technology.3 3 9 Pernicious "lock-ins" may exist, but it
hardly follows that consumers are thereby locked into inferior
products. 340 There is a difference between proving the existence
of inefficiency and proving its absence. If CEOs assert that they
have identified a remediable inefficiency, the onus is on them to
prove it. In the same way that the law presumes an accused
person innocent unless proven guilty, it seeks to minimize the
costs of incorrectly identifying inefficiency by erring on
presumption that the market outcome is efficient unless proven
otherwise. It would therefore be wrong for CEOs to assert that
without evidence of inefficiency, "one may presume to have
proven the outcome is efficient." 341 The line between conviction
and paranoia is a fine one. Unless there is clear proof of
consumer harm in tipped copyright markets flowing from
refusals to license, the EFD has no reason to intervene.
D. Compulsory Licensing, Law and Economics
An economic analysis of the EFD-copyright interface would be
incomplete without considering the mechanics of compulsory
licensing. Perhaps surprisingly, the main objection does not
seem to be the application of compulsory licensing, but rather its
method of application. 342 Instead, the main objection seems to lie
in determining "both a reasonable price for the license and fair
conditions for access by others, and to supervise that access on an
ongoing basis."343 "[T]he notion of reasonable price suggests a

(arguing that policy makers should not go about correcting markets until they
have concrete proof that markets have failed).
339 PETER LEWIN, The Current State of the Debate Involving the Economics of
QWERTY, in THE ECONOMICS OF QWERTY 244, 253 (2002).
340 See Liebowitz & Margolis, Dismal Science Fictions: Network Effects,
Microsoft, and Antitrust Speculation, supra note 348, at 184-87, 205 n.10.
341 Peter
Lewin,
Facts, Values
and
the
Burden
of Proof,
at
9
http://www.utdallas.edu/-plewin/factsValuesandtheBurdenofProof.pdf,
(last visited June 6, 2007).
342 Beatrice Dumont & Peter Holmes, The Scope of Intellectual Property
Rights and their Interface with Competition Law and Policy: Divergent Paths to
the Same Goal?, 11 ECON. OF INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 149, 155 (2002).
343 Herbert Hovenkamp et al, Unilateral Refusals to License in the US, in
ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT: EU AND US PERSPECTIVES 23 (Francois
L~v~que & Howard Shelanski eds., 2005). Indeed, economic studies by Scherer
seem to suggest "compulsory licensing had a very minor negative effect on
innovation." Dumont & Holmes, supra note 342, at 158-59.
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range of acceptable values, not a single figure. '344 Unfortunately,
economics may provide optimal prices, but not "reasonable"
prices. 345 Finding a reasonable price requires a "hypothetical
royalty bargaining between the parties if licensing had been
pursued instead of infringement."3 46 The level could lie anywhere
between a nominal sum for the cost of granting the license, to the
substantial standard of the opportunity cost of allowing market
entry.
It requires historical data and yardstick market
conditions that may be difficult to find in cases involving
standards-setters who had been the first into the market. The
choice of access charges is a delicate one. Barriers to entry may
be created if charges are too high. Conversely, low charges may
generate inefficient entry and discourage the incumbent from
maintaining and upgrading their networks. In the absence of a
competitive market, it may therefore be difficult to say
definitively what is "reasonable."
The EFD seeks to apply rules of microeconomics to the
copyright regime with its own checks and balance. 347 Dennis
Carlton observed that "[a]ntitrust goes astray when it relies on
either poor economic reasoning . . .or when it adopts untested
economic theories . . . [while] economics goes astray when it
creates untestable theories about competitive harm. 34 8 Markets
are complex and diverse. Those familiar with economic theory
will know that the effects of conduct can be quite different with a
small change in assumptions. It is always easier to produce data
consistent with the theory than it is to rule out alternative
explanations. Economists often select markets to study because
data gathering in them is particularly easy or other
characteristics of the market tend to simplify economic analysis.
As a result there are far too many instances when a particular
kind of business conduct has more than one explanation that
economic theory cannot completely rule out alternatives.
Courts are worse than economists in ruling out alternative
344 FRANCOIS L VRQUE, Innovation, Leveraging and Essential Facilities:
InteroperabilityLicensing in the EU Microsoft Case, in ANTITRUST,PATENTS AND
COPYRIGHT: EU AND US PERSPECTIVES 107, 118 (2005).

Id. at 103, 117-18.
Id. at 118-19. "Lawyers conventionally use a list of factors (the so-called
15 Georgia-Pacific factors) to determine the end-points and a likely outcome to
bargaining." Id. at 118.
347 See id. at 121.
348 Dennis W. Carlton, Using Economics to Improve Antitrust Policy, 2004
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 283, 283 (2004).
345
346
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explanations. The judge is typically a well-educated generalist.
The judges' education and sophistication in economics is no
greater than that of the general population. Often the judge will
sit through testimony by experts for the two sides, offering
opposing explanations that seem about equally plausible. This is
a serious problem with private enforcement. It gives rise to the
problem of unprincipled experts whose skills at persuading an
untutored tribunal are often much greater than the quality of
their economic analysis being able to get courts to rubber stamp
349
their leaky theories.
Some practices, such as those involving consumer harm from
tipped and path dependent markets should effectively be immune
because our institutions are not up to the task of identifying
them without producing an unacceptable number of false
positives. When a particular form of behavior is too complex for
reliable analysis, then the only defensible rule is to let the
market rather than the courts control. The legislature can
always intervene, but a court is in hazardous territory when it
assumes that it can improve consumer welfare in every case. An
overly deterrent rule tends to discourage aggressive competition
by everyone, making consumers pay a large price. By contrast,
an underdeterrent rule may permit a few instances of predation
to slip by, but the social cost of such "false negatives" is very
likely much less than the social cost of false positives. These
critiques can prove fatal to the rational administration of the
EFD.
At the same time, the complexity of competition economics
There is much common sense
should not be exaggerated.
350
involved in economic analyses based on sound methodologies.
The focus on economic insights should not be confused with
applying complex, mathematical formulas and/or econometrical
calculation models in competition assessment. The strength of
economics lies in econometric analysis. 51 This means that
349 See Julia A. Martin, Arbitratingin the Alps Rather than Litigating in Los
Angeles: The Advantages of International Intellectual Property-Specific
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 49 STAN. L. REV. 917, 933 (1997).
350 Mario Monti, Comm'r Responsible for Competition Pol'y, Speech at the
Conference at the Europaische Rechtsakademie: The Application of Community
2000),
(Nov.
27,
Courts
by
the
National
Law
Competition
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECHIOO/466&for
mat=HTML&aged=O&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
351 ROBERT J. GORDON, MACROECONOMICS 5 (10th ed. 2006). Economics have
become more and more empirical; "[M]acroeconomic theory examines the
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economists should try to help "de-esoterise" market effects of
copyright and competition law. 3 2 Economics has managed to
35 3
produce respected analysis with concepts such as "happiness,"
and should likely be able to produce copyright access models
based on "reasonableness."
Indeed, recent literature has
produced promising economic models to properly calibrate the
prices in compulsory licensing of copyright. 354 Empirical testing
may exclude alternative hypotheses, thus proving that a given

behavior of aggregates such as national income and the unemployment rate
while ignoring differences among individual households." Id. Gordon further
notes that microeconomic theory "reaches striking conclusions by pretending
that there is just one interest rate, instead of the many rates reported in daily
newspapers." Id.
352 RUDIGER DORNBUSCH ET AL., MACROECONOMICS 12 (9th ed., 2004) ("We
cannot overemphasize this point: The only way to understand the very
complicated world in which we live is to master a toolbox of simplifying models
and to then make quite explicit decisions as to which model is best suited for
analyzing a given problem."). Vikram Khanna once stated:
For me, John Kenneth Galbraith was the first economist-and he
remained one of the few-to make economics come alive and seem relevant
to the real world. I read him all the way from my teens to the present;
fortunately, he was prolific throughout that period. While I did not agree
with everything he wrote, I always found it insightful and refreshing.
Vikram Khanna, Remembering John Kenneth Galbraith 1908-2006: He was the
First Economist to Make Economics Seem Relevant to the Real World, Bus.
TIMES (Sing.), May 4, 2006.
353 See, e.g., John Lloyd, What Price Happiness? How Economics is Learning
to Lighten Up, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), May 1, 2006, at 13. Further, quantifying
abstract concepts is not altogether an unfamiliar concept to economists. Id.
Generally, economists assumed a rational decision. Id. However, some now
want to see how decisions are made in the real world. Id. Dr. Andrew Oswald
is a renown researcher of the economics of happiness. Id. Adair Turner, who
led the U.K. Pensions Commission, stated that the field has integrated other
disciplines to analyse "how people really think, and what makes them really
happy." Id. Turner has found that "[tihe rational approach is often not what
people do. It's determined by what they know, whom they trust and when they
make the decision." Id. Charles Murray has been a strong critic of the research
and has observed that definitions of happiness are often of a European variety.
Id. "That is, the purpose of life is to while it away as pleasantly as possible."
Id.
354 Baumol and Willig propose an interesting economic model where entry
only occurs "if the new entrant, being able to produce with lower marginal cost,
is more efficient than the incumbent." Heimler & Nicita, supra note 1, at 11.
Another suggestion points to the use of Demsetz auctions to grant access to the
firm that bids the lowest user fee. Eduardo M.R.A. Engel, Ronald D. Fischer, &
Alexander Galetovic, How to Auction an Essential Facility When Underhand
Integration is Possible (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
8146, 2001), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8146. L~v~que proposes
a model for optimal price royalty based on a bargaining approach. L6v~que,
supra note 343, at 118-20.
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With established general economic
explanation is correct.
principles, every EFD case need not be analyzed on the basis of
ad hoc fact specific arguments. This saves time, and introduces
simplicity and certainty to the results of weighing arguments.
Should an economic model fail, it should not swept under the rug,
355
but rather is used to highlight what the model misses.
However, courts must remain sensitive to fallacies in economy
theory and never "rubber stamp" what has been put forth
without getting dependable counsel.
Once the preliminary roles of economists are clarified, the next
step is to harmonise the fusion of legal and economic analysis.
"Market definition,"3 56 "barriers to entry," 357 and "product
Whether a
substitutability"358 are clearly economic issues.
copyright owner has "justifiably" refused access as means of
Indeed, courts
defensive leveraging is a legal inquiry. 359
routinely make findings of "reasonableness," even in the most
esoteric subject matter. 360 Competition policy should not retreat
to purely econometric standards in its attempt to use scientific
means to resolve or mask what is an inherently normative
361
dispute requiring a measure of "hunch, faith and intuition."
355 See GORDON, supra note 351, at 334-39 (citing the example of how the
Solow Growth Model's failure opened the way to a unique treatment of the
debate between the new institutional economics and the exponents of the
tropical geography explanation of the failure of poor countries to converge to the
income level of rich countries).
356 POSNER, supra note 123, at 147-58.
357 A barrier to entry is "a condition that imposes higher long-run costs of
production on a new entrant than are borne by the firms already in the
market." Id. at 74 (citing GEORGE J. STIGLER, Barriersto Entry, Economies of
Scale, and Firm Size, in THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67 (1968)).
358 See id. at 149-50.
359 See Hovenkamp et. al., Unilateral Refusals to License in the US, supra
note 343, at 12.
360 See, e.g., Jeremy Au Yong, Room Without a View: Condo Owners Win Suit,
STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), May 28, 2006. Singapore courts were able to quantify the
value of a view at SG $15,000. Id.
Buyers said they were enticed by the showflat and floor plans that featured
a large ceiling-to-floor window running the entire length of one wall,
promising expansive views of the city skyline as well as the sea.
But when they received their keys in early 2004, that was not what they
got. In fact, the bedroom windows had shrunk to nearly half their
showroom size.
Id.
Architectural "experts on both sides offered wildly differing values" stating
that the lost view had decreased the value of the apartments from as low as
$500 to as high as $97,000. Id.
361 Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
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These determinations are in the end a function of the bias or
ideological conviction of the CEOs or judge. It is in areas such as
these where those with cross-disciplinary training can make a
useful contribution. 362 Recent developments of the Faculty of
Law at the National University of Singapore have provided a
timely reminder that the law coexists in an ecosystem with other
disciplines. 363 The double-degree program with the economics
department now complements the traditional four-year LLB
program to train a new generation that are neither lawyers nor
economists, but "lexonomists" who are able to integrate the
training in each field into a synergistic whole. 36 This may well
reflect the multidisciplinary competence that those researching
and practicing competition law will eventually be expected to
possess. These individuals have the expertise to make sure that
competition law is grounded in logical analysis and provide tools
to assess the relative merits of competing economic hypotheses
365
and legal theories.
In addition, copyright tribunals which have long determined
the appropriateness of licensing fees may be better suited to
determine this issue once the competition authorities or courts
have determined that access is necessary. 366 Having a specialist
copyright tribunal would certainly allow an institutional balance
to competition law intervention. 367 Copyright tribunals may offer
a regime more sensitive to balancing copyright appropriability
with spreading the ripple effects of innovation from the original
1051, 1065 (1979). But see Morton J. Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or
Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 905 (1980).

362 Even the US government's chief economic expert, Dr. Franklin Fisher,
described the threat posed by Microsoft in non-economic terms when he testified
that if Microsoft's actions went unchecked, "[w]e will live, as it were, in a
Microsoft world in which choices are the choices that Microsoft makes."
Transcript of Proceedings at 30, U.S. v. Microsoft Corp, 2006 WL 2882808 (D.C.
Cir.
Sept.
7,
2006)
(No.
98-1232),
available
at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/msdoj/transcripts/0112a.doc (last visited June 7,
2007).
363 See, e.g., Nat'l Univ. of Singapore, The New Double Honours Degree in
Economics
and
Law,
http://www.nus.edu.sgprogeconlaw/overview.htm
(outlining the joint degree program between the disciplines of economics and
law) (last visited April 22, 2007).
364 See id.
365 See id.
366 GHIDINI, supra note 181, at 66-67 (arguing that the amount of royalties
can "efficiently be addressed, as international experience shows, by quick
arbitral procedures, even at administrative level-take, for example, the model
that has been offered by the US Copyright Royalty Tribunal.").
367 Anderman, Issues Raised, supra note 42.
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work. The need to achieve a balance is recognized in TRIPS.36s
This has led Valentine Korah to observe "[t]he lack of criteria is
one of the reasons for seldom requiring supply. Some arbitrary
test will have to be set by the Commission, perhaps a proportion
of the licensee's sales, as is fixed by some Member States for the
369
compulsory licensing of performing rights in records."
It is interesting to note that in Singapore, the Copyright
Tribunal has determined that "reasonableness" did not mean a
"logically rational" (or economically efficient) standard, but bore
the broader meaning of "fair" and similar to "equitable
remuneration." 370
It was to be assessed in the particular
circumstances of parties based on commonsense. This translated
into a percentage of the requestor's revenue.37 1 This may provide
a yardstick for pricing access. However, if the current situation
of the Singapore Copyright Tribunal is at all indicative of
corresponding tribunals elsewhere, a radical expansion in
jurisdiction and resources will be necessary in order for them to
properly assist CEOs and courts. 372
IV. CONCLUSIONS
There is no retreat from the growth of copyright over
functional works. Business needs shape the law. As economies
become more technology dependent, the case for exclusive rights
in database and software industries will be more compelling. To
reduce the commercial risks from misappropriation in already
risky ventures, businesses appreciate and, in some cases,
demand the security that copyright provides in safeguarding
368 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
art 7, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/27-trips.pdf. Article 7 states that
[t]he protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer
and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and
users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.
Id.
369 KoRAH, supra note 35, at 163.
370 Singapore Broad. Corp. v. Performing Right Soc'y Ltd, [1991] F.S.R. 573,
593 (Copyright Tr.) (Sing.).
371 Id. at 599.
372 The Singapore Copyright Tribunal was set up to investigate performing,
broadcast and cable program licenses. See GEORGE WEI, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT
IN SINGAPORE 1124-32 (2d ed., 2000). It would therefore not have been able to
hear cases on access to databases and software.
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their investments. This is not ideal, as it trades one form of risk
for another-the risk that information gets balkanised by
copyright owners controlling access to interface information or
raw data. As Herbert Hovenkamp noted:
Congress has continuously expanded the scope of patent and
copyright, and . . . [a] strong case can be made that today we
overprotect at least certain intellectual property rights, perhaps
severely so. This problem is in the first instance not one for the
antitrust laws, but it necessarily shows up in the attitude that
property practices that are
antitrust takes toward intellectual
37 3
alleged to be anticompetitive.
The danger is real, particularly where copyright owners also
generate that information, as in the case of databases. A strong
case may be made to support the EFD in requiring access in such
cases. The owner has expanded no creative effort. While in some
cases, the incentive to create may be dampened by access, it is
difficult to see how, on the facts of cases such as Magill, Feist and
BHB that will be the case. However, policing banal rights is not
the role of competition law. Its purpose is to make markets
perform more competitively, and intervention is justified only
when it moves the market toward that goal.3 7 4 It is clear that
private firms should not be allowed to stifle distinctly new
products outside the scope of their copyright based on dynamic
efficiency arguments. The owner's right to appropriation is not
an unlimited one. Neither should firms previously protected
from competition by government policies be allowed to prevent
the emergence of alternatives. In these cases, the net dynamic
efficiency gains are relatively clearer. These instances should be
contrasted with situations such as in IMS Health, where rivals
are seeking access simply to parasitically duplicate the
This lowers the
copyrighted content of a private firm. 375
likelihood of false convictions, though it does not eliminate it
completely. At some level, determining an optimal approach can
be maddeningly speculative. But it is impossible to see how
determining the potential effects of intervention in a regime
created to promote incentives to create could be otherwise.
373 HOVENKAMP, supra note 194, at 3. Similarly, the Commission's interim
decision in IMS Health is devoid of such an express limitation. If the
Commission and EC Courts had wished to limit the application of competition
in the compulsory licensing setting to banal copyright-protected works, they
could have done so.
374 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 194, at 48.
375 See Lang, supra note 240, at 74.
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It is more controversial whether an identical attitude can be
transposed in "superdominant" owners or industries tipped in
Interventionist
favor of the copyright owner's standard.
strategies may pay off by generating more competition in the
domestic market through greater product variety and lower
prices. However, rather broad economic theories would force
CEOs and courts to confront problems that they may be not
capable of solving. Misplaced intervention directs attention away
from efficient product to a mere paper shuffling. It adds nothing
to efficiency, and in fact, subtracts from it. Many industries in
the global markets are porous. Copyright in functional works
more so than most. Open markets may come at the cost of
licensing and even research and development being chilled-such
activities could be carried out elsewhere with the loss of many
well-paid and interesting jobs.
At the very least, it must be conceded that this makes the
market less attractive to large copyright conglomerates with
much to lose by risking disclosure of their assets-a disclosure
that in an interconnected digital world, can permeate far beyond
national borders very quickly. US jurisprudence suggests that it
recognizes this, and has decided instead to adopt an approach
that cedes more discretion to internal regulation in the form of
exceptions and limitations within copyright law. 376 Against the

relative polarity in the EU this position may attract investment
growth and generate attractive job opportunities for many
Americans in database and software industries, as well as
industries that support them. Singapore will soon have to decide
its own path. It is economically far more vulnerable to negative
market sentiments, and must be even more careful than the EU
and US. On a larger scale, it will be interesting to see which
model will become the benchmark377 for an international
competition policy equivalent of TRIPS.
The EFD is a defensible doctrine only if it can make markets
more competitive-that is, if intervention produces lower prices,
larger outputs, or improved product quality. Developing rules
that reliably promote consumer welfare is a daunting task that
376 See generally Hovenkamp et. al., supra note 343, at 12-56 (offering an
overview of the exceptions and loopholes of antitrust application to intellectual
property rights in the US).
377 Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust: The Big Picture, in ANTITRUST UNDER THE
CLINTON ADMINISTRATION 347, 350 (MCLE 1993) (speculating on whether the
EU model will become the world standard).
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courts and CEOs can perform with confidence only if they are
applying theories that are within their grasp. 378 The rules at the
Interface must be administrable by courts with reasonable
accuracy.
They must also be robust and improve market
performance. This is where economics plays a critical role in
making dynamic efficiency less esoteric, by provided useful ways
to measure the impact of regulation on innovation and calibrate
the correct prices for compulsory licenses. In addition, economic
theory provides an important safeguard against rivals who do not
have the skill or drive to blaze their own path, but instead simply
wish to appropriate the capital investment and business efforts of
their successful predecessors in the relevant market under the
guise of requiring fair access to essential facilities. In this
regard, SERCI and the IP Academy are critical forerunners.
While both are only in their early years of existence, they already
have a commendable history of promoting economic research and
constructive debate in copyright and other forms of IPRs, and in
bringing together legal and economic minds at a common
platform. It is highly significant that their individual efforts
dovetailed this year at the present conference. It is hoped that
such events will catalyse more constructive debate that work
towards establishing a sound and equitable framework to
nurture the growth of innovation.

378 HOVENKAMP, supra note 194, at 39 (noting that "[tihe biggest danger
presented by post-Chicago antitrust economics is not that the variety and
likelihood of anticompetitive practices are exaggerated, although that too has
happened," but the self-assurance that courts and regulators are capable to
handle its complexity).
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